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Mr. Nnanyelugo Nnebechi Okonkwo (Okonkwo), a native of Onitsha,
a town in southeastern Nigeria, died in 1931.1 During his lifetime,
Okonkwo had five male children.2 Thirty years after Okonkwo's death, his
sisters, acting purportedly under Onitsha native law and custom, married a
wife (X) on his behalf.3 X gave birth to six children who all bear
Okonkwo's name.4 In a case that was fought all the way to the Nigerian
Supreme Court (Supreme Court), the central questions before the Supreme
Court were whether the living can legally contract a marriage on behalf of
the dead and whether a man can procreate thirty years after his death. 5
Drawing on the repugnancy test, an inherited colonial principle, the
Supreme Court held that the custom which allowed marriage on behalf of
the dead was repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience and
therefore unenforceable.6
In many parts of Africa, customary law recognizes the legality of
posthumous procreation. By means of numerous forms of arrangements,
including levirate marriage, ghost marriage, and woman-to-woman
marriage, a dead man can become the legal father of children sired by
another man long after his death. However, age-old practices have come
under attack from courts in Africa and from international human rights
* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. I would like to express
my thanks to Barrister Emeka Ewelukwa, Esq. for bringing the Nigerian Supreme Court
decisions in Okonkwo v. Okagbue and Muojekwu v. Ejikeme to my attention and for reading
earlier drafts of this paper. These two cases prompted my desire to analyze the issue of
posthumous reproduction in Africa and to examine the relationship between culture and
international human rights norms. This Article is a preliminary attempt to address two
issues that both deserve much deeper analysis.
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advocates. Drawing on two related but distinct sources - the repugnancy
principle and international human rights norms - courts have invalidated
customs pertaining to posthumous procreation. Some international human
rights bodies have also expressed concern about the human rights
implications of some of the practices.
At first blush, posthumous procreation African style (PPAS) seems
primitive at best. At worst, ?PAS may be considered repugnant to public
policy, public morality, and public health. However, problems arise when
African customs are evaluated through the lens of Western laws and values.
Unforeseen difficulties arise when attempts are made to abruptly and hastily
discard longstanding rules and regulations that govern a society. Forced or
hasty abolition of entrenched customary rules sometimes results in further
violation of human rights. Problems also arise when practices in non-Western
societies are condemned while arguably comparable practices in the West are
ignored or even promoted. In this respect, a critical and penetrating look at
posthumuous procreation in the West using new assisted reproductive
technologies (ART) unearths many complex and troubling issues that arguably
deserve urgent attention.7 The application of cryogenetics to human sperm
now makes it possible not only to retrieve sperm from dead men, but also to
use the gamete retrieved in subsequent assisted reproduction.8 Although
posthumous retrieval, storage, and use of sperm in assisted reproduction
arguably raises many troubling ethical, moral and legal issues, no human rights
body has passed judgment on the practice. What is evident, one could argue, is
a biased approach to human rights work and a double standard in international
human rights discourse. Unless carefully deployed, international human rights
law could increasingly be viewed as a vehicle for delegitimizing non-Western
customs and imposing Western values on non-Western societies. 9
7. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Posthumous Reproduction, 67
Supp. 82 FERTILITY AND STERILITY S260, S261 (1997), available at http://www.asrm.org/
Media/Ethics/posthumous.pdf. A statement developed by the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine's Ethics Committee and accepted by the Board of Directors on
January 10, 1997 notes that "posthumous reproduction raises more ethical, practical, and
legal questions for physicians practicing reproductive medicine and the public .... Id.
8. The idea of freezing sperm has been experimented with since the late 1700s.
However, the technology for the effective freezing of sperm became available only around
the middle of the twentieth century. See Andrology (University of Utah), Treatment
Options: Sperm Freezing (Cryopreservation), http://www.utahhealthsciences.net/pageview.
aspx?id=16666 (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (observing that it was not until fifty years ago
that human sperm were capable of being frozen, and later thawed in such a way that they
could fertilize an egg and initiate development). Today, cryopreservation of sperm is
widely available, at least in industrialized countries. There are several reasons why people
choose cryopreservation including vasectomy and treatment of malignant disease. Although
vasectomies can be surgically reversed, success is never guaranteed, surgery is most often
expensive, and "after an initially successful reversal, the ducts through which the sperm
travel often develop scar tissue and become obstructed." Id. The chemotherapeutic agents
and radiation therapy used to treat diseases such as Hodgkin's disease, leukemia, testicular
cancer, and other malignancies also affect the production of sperm. Id.
9. Elisabetta Grande, Hegemonic Human Rights and African Resistance: Female
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In the final analysis, the appeal to international human rights norms
does not always yield optimal outcomes. The challenge for Africans is to
find ways to ensure periodic review and revision of customary laws and
practices that do not entail the devaluing of whole cultures. The challenge
for human rights advocates is to move towards a genuinely universal
approach to human rights work - an approach that calls for
communication among cultures and a single, not double, standard in
evaluating practices in diverse cultures.
This Article focuses on the unequal treatment of PPAS and what I call
posthumous procreation Western style (PPWS) in human rights discourse.
It seeks answers to a number of questions: Does this unequal treatment
demonstrate ethnocentricism, hypocrisy, or ignorance? Does the unequal
treatment reflect fundamental transcultural differences in the approaches to
posthumous conception and reproduction or a misunderstanding of
unfamiliar practices? This Article neither justifies nor condemns PPAS.
Equally, this Article neither justifies nor condemns PPWS; it simply seeks
to shed light on similarities in practices across cultures and civilizations -
similarities that are apt to be ignored by international human rights bodies
and human rights activists. It is hoped that this Article will prompt genuine
cross-cultural dialogue on implications of posthumous reproduction for all
children. By highlighting the limitations of international human rights law
in addressing complex issues that arise in diverse cultures and the dilemma
that human rights advocates face in attempting to eradicate age-old customs
and practices, it is also hoped that this Article will foster debate on
alternative approaches to reforming questionable customary laws and
practices - approaches that do not involve the delegitimization of whole
cultures. This Article calls for caution in the application of the repugnancy
test in contemporary Africa and for utmost care in the deployment of
international human rights norms from the top in any effort to abolish
longstanding customary rules and practices in non-Western societies.
Posthumous procreation is not to be confused with posthumous birth.
Posthumous birth dates back to antiquity and occurs when a husband or
male partner dies after conception and pregnancy but before the child is
born. Posthumous procreation, on the other hand, arises i. a situation
where conception, pregnancy, and birth occur after the death of a husband
or male partner. While posthumous birth presents few, if any, legal or
ethical problems, posthumous procreation raises numerous ones. This
Article is concerned with posthumous procreation.
Circumcision in a Broader Comparative Perspective, 4 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS No. 2,
art. 3, 1 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol4/iss2/art3 (observing
that many see the human rights discourse as part of a Western discourse or even a Western
hegemonic discourse).
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II. POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION AFRICAN STYLE
This section briefly reviews unconventional arrangements through
which men have traditionally been able to have children posthumously
among various African ethnic groups, including the Igbo of Nigeria, and
the Nuer and Dinka of Sudan.
A. CHILDREN THROUGH UNCONVENTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
To continue the family line of descent, there are at least four ways that
children born posthumously can be attributed to a deceased among these
ethnic groups: (1) the levirate marriage; (2) the woman-to-woman
marriage; (3) ghost marriage; and (4) the nwunye nrachi custom.' 0
Common in all four situations is the fact that children resulting from these
arrangements do not belong to their biological fathers even if the biological
father is alive. In all four cases, the resulting children are attributed to a
deceased person for purposes of inheritance and legitimacy. Although with
modernization and the shift to monogamy the various arrangements
described have fallen into serious disuse, the practices continue to some
degree in some parts of Africa.
1. Levirate Marriage
Among some ethnic groups, a widow may be inherited by her
husband's brother or other surviving male relative." This is frequently the
case when a man dies without a male issue.12  Because the previous
marriage was not considered terminated by death, it continues through
marriage to a relative of the deceased.13 Children born to the union are
considered children of the widow's dead husband.' 4  The rights of the
inheritor are limited.' 5 His primary function is procreation and to provide
security for the widow and her children. 16 This tradition is practiced in
various parts of Africa. 17 Levirate marriage, known as Yibbum, was also
known in ancient Israel.18 The great-grandmother of King David, Ruth,
10. See, e.g., Celestine A. Obi, Marriage Among the Igbo of Nigeria,
http://www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/igbo-marriage.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (discussing
levirate marriage (also called "Nwunye Nkuchi"), woman-to-woman marriage, ghost
marriage and Nwunye Nrachi (also called Nwunye Nhachi) among the Igbo people).
11. C.K. MEEK, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN A NIGERIAN TRIBE 321 (Oxford University
Press 1937) (observing that among some groups widows are inheritable and may become
wives of brothers or sons of the deceased. In the later case, the son inherits the widow who
is not his own mother).
12. Id.
13. Obi, supra note 10, at 7.
14. See, e.g., Atem Yaak Atem, Dinka marriage customs at crossroads, SUDAN




17. Id.; Obi, supra note 10, at 7.
18. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Israeli Democracy, Religion, and the Practice of
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was inherited by Boaz, a relative of her late husband, Mahlon.' 9 Indeed it
was a duty of a man to marry his brother's widow if his brother died
without a son.20 A brother-in-law who refused to marry his brother's
widow brought disgrace upon himself and his family. 2 ' The full
commandment is spelled out in the Book of Deuteronomy 25:5-6:
If brothers dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, the
wife of the dead shall not be married outside the family to a
stranger; her husband's brother shall go in to her, and take her as
his wife, and perform the duty of a husband's brother to her. And
the first son whom she bears shall succeed to the name of his
brother who is dead, that his name may not be blotted out of
Israel.22
It must be noted that the Holy Bible provided an escape clause for
individuals not wishing to go through the levirate marriage. The ceremony
by which a widow and her husband's brother could avoid the duty to marry
after the husband's death is known as Halizah or Chalitzah.23 According to
Deuteronomy 25:7-10:
[I]f the man does not wish to take his brother's wife, then his
brother's wife shall go up to the gate to the elders, and say, "My
husband's brother refuses to perpetuate his brother's name in
Israel; he will not perform the duty of a husband's brother to me."
Then the elders of his city shall call him, and speak to him: and if
he persists, saying, "I do not wish to take her," then his brother's
wife shall go up to him in the presence of the elders, and pull his
sandal off his foot, and spit in his face; and she shall answer and
say, "So shall it be done to the man who does not build up his
brother's house." And the name of his house shall be called in
Israel, The house of him that had his sandal pulled off.
24
2. Woman-to-Woman Marriage
The woman-to-woman marriage is a practice whereby a widow who is
infertile or too old to conceive marries another woman on behalf of her
dead husband.2 5 An infertile woman would go to such lengths for at least
Haliza in Jewish Law, 11 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 45, 59 (2000-200 1).
19. Ruth 3:9.
20. Deuteronomy 25:5-6.
21. Id. at 25:7-11.
22. Id. at 25:5-6.
23. Cohen-Almagor, supra note 18, at 59.
24. Id.
25. Marriage Rules: Part II, http://anthro.palomar.edu/marriage/marriage-4.htm
(last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (discussing the practice of woman-to-woman marriage among
the Nuer tribe of East Africa).
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two reasons: First, to strengthen her position in her husband's family, since
without a child, a woman's status in her marital home is uncertain at best;
second, to remove the curse of infertility.26 This is not a lesbian
relationship.27 Usually a "secret" lover is found to impregnate the wife.28
Any resulting children bear the name of the widow's deceased husband.29
The widow raises the children for her husband by proxy and becomes the
socially recognized "father" of the children born. 30 The practice has been
noted in many parts of Africa.3'
3. Ghost Marriage
A ghost marriage occurs when an unmarried man dies without a male
heir.32 In order to ensure that his family line does not die out, relatives may
decide to marry a woman to the name of the dead man.33 A secret lover is
34then found to impregnate the woman. In some cases the lover may be a
relative of the dead man.35 The secret lover stands in for the dead man.36
Children born of this marriage bear the name of the dead man.37 The dead
man (the Ghost) is the socially recognized father of the children.38 The
children are the legally recognized descendants of the dead man. 39 This
practice occurs in Igboland and has also been noted in other African
40societies.
26. See Obi, supra note 10, at 7.
This [woman-to-woman marriage] may be described as the devise whereby a
sterile woman tries to render her supreme service to society, thereby
strengthening her position as a useful and responsible member of her
husband's family. She pays for a new life on behalf of her husband, or she
provides him with the necessary funds for a new marriage, with a view to
raising children for her husband by proxy as we may put it.
Id.
27. Marriage Rules: Part II, supra note 25.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. See also Obi, supra note 10, at 7.
31. Obi, supra note 10, at 7.
32. Id. ("Ghost marriage ... consists in a woman being married to the name of a
man who died unmarried so that his line need not die out.").






39. Obi, supra note 10, at 7.
40. Atem, supra note 14 (observing that the practice occurs among the Dinka in
Sudan but is coming under attack in the wake of the HIV/AIDS pandemic). See also Obi,
supra note 10, at 7.
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4. Nwunye Nrachi
Nwunye Nrachi occurs in situations where a man dies without a male
heir but with daughters of marriageable age.4 One of the daughters may be
persuaded to remain unmarried but nevertheless beget children on behalf of
her dead father. 2 The goal is to produce male heirs. 3 The children, thus
raised, are legally those of the woman's dead father and inherit his
property. 4  After the Nrachi ceremony is performed on a daughter, "she
takes the position of a man in [her] father's house. '45 Technically, she
becomes a "man. 46 She must stay unmarried for the rest of her life to
produce male children for her father.47 Nwunye Nrachi, thus, gives a
woman freedom to procreate outside the bounds of marriage in the name of
her father 8 It must be stressed that no incest is involved and usually the
woman in question finds a "secret" lover with whom to biologically
conceive the children.4 9  No empirical study has been conducted to
determine if female children are coerced by their father, prior to his death,
into accepting the Nrachi custom.
In order to deal with the frustration of premature male death and ensure
societal survival, ethnic groups in Africa have devised various mechanisms
through which children may be attributed to a man long after his death.
The result of the arrangements described was, and still is, the preservation
of the "name" of the departed. A man's name is preserved only with the
provision of a male heir to inherit his property and ensure that the property
is kept in the family and in the normal line of inheritance. Even in the
absence of any specific marriage arrangement, children born to a widow
after the death of her husband are regarded as children of the deceased
husband if the widow remains unmarried, remains in her late husband's
home, and her dowry is not returned.50
B. THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW
In Oyewunmi v. Ogunesan, the Nigerian Supreme Court defined
customary law as "the organic living law of indigenous people of Nigeria
regulating their lives and transaction." 51 The Supreme Court has also
defined it as "any system of law not being the common law and not being a
41. Obi, supra note 10, at 7.









50. MEEK, supra note 11, at 321-22.
51. Oyewunmi v. Ogunesan, [1990] 3 N.W.L.R. (Part 137) 207 E - F (Nig.).
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law enacted by any competent legislature in Nigeria but which is
enforceable and binding within Nigeria as between the parties subject to its
,,52sway. In essence, customary law is an evolutionary, non-prescriptive
system of law and depends largely on the assent of the people governed by
it.53 As the Privy Council once observed, "[i]t is the assent of the native
community that gives a custom its validity, and, therefore, barbarous or
mild, it must be shown to be recognised by the native community whose
conduct it is supposed to regulate. 54 The fact that every native custom
challenged in court must pass the repugnancy test casts a shadow on the
claim that the validity of customary law depends on popular assent.55
How is a custom proved in a court of law? In Nigeria, the answer is
found in Section 14 of the Evidence Act, which provides two ways to
establish the existence of a custom. 56 First, a custom may be judicially
noticed.57 The court may take judicial notice of the custom
if it has been acted upon by a court of superior or co-ordinate
jurisdiction in the same area to an extent which justifies the court
asked to apply it in assuming that the persons or the class of
persons concerned in that area look upon the same as binding in
relation to circumstances similar to those under consideration. 8
Second, a custom may be adopted as part of the law governing particular
circumstances "by calling evidence to show that persons or the class of
persons concerned in the particular area regard the alleged custom as
binding upon them., 59 Customary law is therefore a question of fact that
must be duly established by any party asserting its existence.6 °
52. John Ademola Yakubu, Colonialism, Customary Law and the Post-Colonial
State in Africa: The Case of Nigeria, 30 AFR. DEV. No. 4, 201, 209 (2005) (citing Ohai v.
Akpemonye, [1991] S.C.N.J. 77 (Nig.), and Zaiden v. Mohssen, [1973] 11 S.C. 1 (Nig.)).
53. Id.
54. Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Gov't of Nig., [1931] A.C. 662
(Nig.).
55. Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Judicial Recognition and Adoption of Customary Law in
Nigeria, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 571, 586 (1989) (observing "[t]hus, the validity of customary
law no longer depends solely on the assent of the community but also to a lesser extent on
the opinion of the judge, applying the repugnancy test.").
56. Evidence Act, (1990) Cap. (112), 14(2), (3) (Nig.).
57. Id. at 14(2).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 14(3).
60. See Yakubu, supra note 52, at 202 (stating that "[clustomary law ... is a matter
of evidence to be decided on the facts presented before the court in each case. Indeed,
customary law is a question of fact which must be proved by evidence if judicial notice is
not available through decided cases of the superior courts." (citing Ifabiyi v. Adeniyi, [2000]
5 S.C.N.J. 1, 11)). See also id. at 216 (stating that "[a]s in the case with all customary law,
it has to be proved in the first instance by calling witnesses acquainted with the native law
and customs until the particular customs by frequent proof in the courts have become so
notorious that the courts will take judicial notice of them." (citing Angu v. Attah, [1916]
Gold Coast P.C. Judgments 1874-1928, 43, 44)).
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C. CONCLUSION
An appreciation of the importance of lineage, marriage, and children in
patrilineal and patrilocal societies is critical to an understanding of the
custom of marriage on behalf of the dead among ethnic groups in Africa.
Among the Igbo, for example, marriage occupies a very important place in
the social economy of the tribe.61 Marriage is considered "an indispensable
factor for the continuation of the family line of descent., 62 Considered an
alliance between two families rather than a contract between two
individuals, an Igbo marriage is not necessarily terminated by death.63
Children are central to any marriage 64 and male children are highly
regarded. Inheritance is based on the male lineage and men control wealth
and property. 65 A man can perpetuate his name and that of his clan only by
having male children who bear his name.66 As Victor Uchendu rightly
notes, "[t]o have a male child is to strengthen both the social and the
economic status, for it is the male child who inherits the father's
property., 67 He notes further that "[a] woman - and worse still, a man
who has no male child contemplates old age with particular horror.,
68
To appreciate the ready acceptance of posthumous procreation among
ethnic groups in Africa, an understanding of the concept of social
parenthood is also called for. In times past, customary law, in most parts of
Africa, recognized that it is possible for many people, besides the
biological parents, to have some sort of connection with a child and
allocated different powers and responsibilities to these people.69
Customary law accorded some form of recognition to persons performing
the social role of parenting even in the absence of a genetic link.70 Legal
parenthood did not automatically follow genetic parentage. 71 Therefore,
the absence of such a genetic connection did not prevent recognition as a
legal parent.72 Overall, there was and still is much fluidity in Africa
61. Obi, supra note 10, at 1.
62. Id.
63. VICTOR C. UCHENDU, THE IGBO OF SOUTHEAST NIGERIA 50 (Holt, Rinehart &
Winston 1965) (observing that death does not terminate the marriage alliance in Igboland).
64. Obi, supra note 10, at 1.




69. WORLD SCRIPTURE: A COMPARATIVE ANTHOLOGY OF SACRED TEXTS, TRUE
PARENTS ORGANIZATION (Andrew Wilson ed., Paragon House 1991), selections available at
http://www.tparents.org/Library/Unification/Books/World-S/WS-04-02.htm.
70. Yakubu, supra note 52, at 210 (citing Ejanor v. Okenome, "according to Ishan
customary law, the paternity of a child born by a wife at a time when the customary
marriage had not been dissolved by the refund of dowry paid belonged to the husband even
though he was not the biological father.").
71. Id.
72. Id.
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surrounding the definition of parenthood and the characteristics of
fatherhood. As the court observed in the 1949 case of The Estate of
Agboruja:
[T]he custom by which a man's heir is his next male relative,
whether brother, son, uncle, or even cousin, is widespread
throughout Nigeria. When there are minor children it means that
the father's heir becomes their new father. This is a real
relationship and the new fathers regard the children as their own
children. Whenever this custom prevails, native courts follow
it .... 73
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION
IN AFRICA
Over the years, Nigerian courts have directly as well as indirectly
concluded that the various customary practices relating to posthumous
procreation are invalid and unenforceable.74 By declaring ghost marriages,
levirate marriage, woman-to-woman marriage, and the Nrachi custom to be
repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience, the courts are
effectively closing the door to the inexpensive, traditional, and community-
sanctioned approaches to posthumous reproduction in Africa.
A. BACKGROUND TO THE REPUGNANCY PRINCIPLE
European contacts with Africa during the colonial period "resulted in
the existence of at least two legal systems - the imported and the
indigenous - each applied in the main by an almost entirely separate
system of courts.",75  First, ordinances were passed legitimating the
application of English Law including the common law, the doctrines of
equity, and the statutes of general application.76 Second, special provisions
were made for the courts to continue to apply customary laws.7 7 Third,
rules of evidence were adopted to provide for proof of customary law in the
courts. 78 During the colonial period, therefore, British-established courts
were required to administer native laws and customs. 79  From the
73. Yakubu, supra note 52, at 211 (citing The Estate of Agboruja, [1949] 19 N.L.R.
38 (Nig.)).
74. See Section III. B. of this Article.
75. W.C. Ekow Daniels, The Interaction of English Law with Customary Law in
West Africa, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 574, 574 (1964).
76. See SUPREME COURT ORDINANCE § 14 (1914) (Nig.) ("[T]he common law, the
ordinance of equity, and the statutes of general application which were in force in England as
at January 1, 1900 shall be in force within the jurisdiction of the court."). See also Yakubu, supra
note 52, at 202 (citing GHANA, SUPREME COURT ORDINANCE Np. 4, § 14 (1876)).
77. See generally F. A. Ajayi, The Interaction of English Law with Customary Law
in Western Nigeria: II, 4 J. AFR. L. 98 (1960).
78. Id. at 99.
79. Id. at 98 ("The High Court is further required by s.17 (4) to apply 'the particular
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2
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beginning, the question was whether the court should administer strict and
undiluted customary law. The repugnancy principle was imported into
Africa and became the standard by which African laws and customs were
evaluated. 80 Colonial courts 81 and native courts82 were both empowered to
apply the repugnancy test.
Today, a series of inherited colonial laws allows courts to continue to
apply the repugnancy principle. 83 For example, section 13(1) of the Mid-
Western State High Court Law No. 9 of 1964 states that
[t]he High Court shall observe and enforce the observance of every
customary law which is applicable and is not repugnant to natural
justice, equity and good conscience, nor incompatible either
directly or by implication with any written law for the time being
customary law which is appropriate' in each case, having regard to the provisions of s.20 of
the Customary Courts Law, 1957."). Ajayi, supra note 77, at 98.
80. See generally Yakubu, supra note 52, at 203-04 (citing THE SUPREME COURT
ORDINANCE No. 11 (1863) (Nig.); Native Court Proclamation No. 9 (1900) (Nig.); Native
Court Proclamation No. 25 (1901) (Nig.); and THE SUPREME COURT ORDINANCE § 20 (1914)
(Nig.)). All these statutes made provisions for the application of customary law subject to
the satisfaction of the repugnancy test. The use of the repugnancy test is not limited to
Nigeria. A Gambia law provided:
Nothing in this Ordinance shall deprive the courts of the right to observe and
enforce the observance, or shall deprive any person of the benefit, of any law
or custom existing in Gambia, such law or custom not being repugnant to
natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor incompatible either directly
or by necessary implication with any law, for the time being in force.
Daniels, supra note 75 (citing Gambia, Ordinance 3, § 5 (1955) (Laws of the Gambia, 1955 Rev.)).
81. Nonso Okereafoezeke, Judging the Enforceability of Nigeria's Native Laws,
Customs, and Traditions in the Face of Official Controls, Paper presented at the
Southeastern Regional Seminar in African Studies (Apr. 6-7, 2001), available at
http://www.ecu.edu/african/sersas/Papers/OkereafoezekeN28Mar0 1.htm (citing
Proclamation No. 6 of 1900 (Nig.)). This law was enacted to consolidate British rule over
Nigeria and remains a part of the Nigerian justice system.
82. Native courts were established for the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos to the
Native Court Proclamation No. 9 of 1900 (Nig.). Yakubu, supra note 52, at 204. This
statute was replaced by subsequent statutes including the Native Courts Proclamation No.
25 of 1901 (Nig.) and the Native Courts Proclamation No. 7 of 1906 (Nig.). Id. See also
Daniels, supra note 75, at 574-75 (citing Western NigeriaCustomary Courts Law, No. 26
(1957) (Nig.); Sharia Court of Appeal Law, 1960, N.R. No. 16 (1960) (Nig.)).
83. Yakubu, supra note 52, at 208 (citing section 14 subsection (3) of the Evidence
Law, Cap. 49 of the Laws of Eastern Nigeria1963), which provides:
Where a custom cannot be established as one judicially noticed it may be
established and adopted as part of the law governing particular
circumstances by calling evidence to show that persons or the class of
persons concerned in the particular area regard the alleged custom as binding
upon them: Provided that in the case of any custom relied upon in any
judicial proceeding it shall not be enforced as law if it is contrary to public
policy and not in accordance with natural justice, equity and good
conscience.
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in force, and nothing in this law shall deprive any person of the
benefit of any such customary law.84
Similar laws exist in Northern Nigeria 85 and Western Nigeria. 86 Customary
laws that fail the repugnancy test are unenforceable and void.
B. APPLICATION OF REPUGNANCY TEST TO POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION
1. Ghost Marriage/Woman-to-Woman Marriage: Okonkwo v. Okagbue
At issue in Okonkwo v. Okagbue was the validity and enforceability of
a custom that allowed sisters of a dead man to marry a wife on his behalf as
well as the legal status of any children resulting from such a marriage.
87
The plaintiffs/appellants were the surviving sons of the late Okonkwo, born
to him by his first wife.88 The first and second defendants/respondents
were the surviving sisters of the late Okonkwo. 8 9 Although Okonkwo died
in 1931, on or before March 1968, the first and second defendants married
the third defendant (X) for and on behalf of their late brother without the
knowledge of the plaintiffs. 90 As a result of the marriage, the third
defendant gave birth to six children. 91 The children all bear the name of the
late Okonkwo and hold themselves out as his children.
92
At issue therefore was the validity of the marriage contracted by the
first and second defendants on behalf of the late Okonkwo and the
inheritance rights of children born to such a marriage. 93 The sole issue for
determination was whether the native law and custom in question was
repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience or was against
public policy. 94 The Supreme Court started by noting that, "[m]arriage as it
84. Kharie Zaidan v. Faitma Khalil Mohssen, 20 J. AFR. L. No. 1, 70, 73 (1976).
85. Yakubu, supra note 52, at 207.
The High Court shall observe, and enforce the observance of every native
law and custom which is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good
conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by implication with any law
for the time being in force, and nothing in this law shall deprive any person
of the benefit of any such native law or custom.
Yakubu, supra note 52, at 207 (citing section 34 (1) of the High Court Law of Northern
Region 1963, applicable to the whole of the Northern Region).
86. Id. at 207 ("The High Court shall observe and enforce the observance of every
customary law which is applicable and is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good
conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by implication with any written law for the
time being in force, and nothing in this Law shall deprive any person of the benefit of any
such customary law." (citing Laws of Western Region of Nigeria§ 12 (1959) (Nig.))).
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is commonly known is a union of a man and a woman," and "[flor a
marriage to be meaningful it is necessary for the husband to physically
exist so that the marriage can be consummated., 95 The Court further
observed that, "one of the essentials of marriage under customary law is the
element of procreation; which is only achievable when both the husband
and wife are together alive." 96 The Court concluded that the purported
marriage of the third defendant for the deceased thirty years after his death
was a fiction and a fallacy.97 According to the Court, "there is no way in




Nigerian courts have also held that woman-to-woman marriage is
repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience and therefore
void. 99 According to Justice Madarikan in the 1976 case of Eugene Meribe
v. Joshua C. Egwu:
In every system of jurisprudence known to us, one of the essential
requirements for a valid marriage is that it must be the union of a
man and a woman thereby creating a status of husband and wife.
Indeed, the law governing any decent society should abhor and
express its indignation of a "woman-to-woman" marriage; and
where there is proof that a custom permits such an association, the
custom must be regarded as repugnant by virtue of the proviso to
section 14(3) of the Evidence Act and ought not to be upheld by
the court.'00
The Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion more recently in
Okonkwo v. Okagbue.'0' Citing with approval the decision in Meribe v. .
Egwu, the Supreme Court in Okonkwo v. Okagbue noted that marriage on
behalf of the dead was repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good
conscience and observed that, at best, what happened in the case was a
"marriage" between Okonkwo's sisters and the woman they married on
behalf of their brother, that is, a marriage between a woman and two
women. 10 2 In the opinion of the Court, a woman-to-woman marriage "must
95. EUNICE N. U. UZODIKE, THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 343-44





99. C.O. Akpamgbo, A "Woman to Woman" Marriage and the Repugnancy Clause:
A Case of Putting New Wine Into Old Bottles, 14 AFR. L. STUD. 87 (1977) (citing Eugene
Meribe v. Joshua Egwu, [1976] 3 N.S.C.C. 23 (Nig.)).
100. Id.
101. Okonkwo v. Okagbue and 2 Others, [1994] 12 N.S.C.C. 40 (Nig.).
102. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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be regarded [as] repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience"
and is consequently invalid.
10 3
3. Levirate Marriage
In The Estate of Agboruja, the court upheld the validity of a levirate
marriage.l°4 Overruling the decision of the Administrator-General that the
custom of levirate marriage was repugnant, Ames, Ag. S.P.J. stated:
[T]here can be nothing intrinsically unfair or inequitable even in
the inheritance of widows, where those who follow the custom are
pagans and not Mohammedans or Christians. The custom is based
on what might be called the economics of one kind of African
social system, in which the family is regarded as a composite
unit.1°5
More recently, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) 10 6 has categorically
stated that it considers customary practices such as the levirate to be a
violation of women's fundamental rights10 7  and recommends that
governments enact legislation to prohibit such practices and prosecute
perpetrators of such practices.'08
4. Nwunye Nrachi Custom
In Muojekwu v. Ejikeme one of the issues before the Nigerian Court of
Appeal (Court of Appeal) was whether the Nrachi custom was valid and
enforceable. 10 9 Relying on the repugnancy principle and international
human rights norms, the Court of Appeal concluded that the custom was
103. Okonkwo, [1994] 12 N.S.C.C. 40 (Nig.).
104. Yakubu, supra note 52, at 211 (citing The Estate of Agboruja, [1949] 19 N.L.R.
38 (Nig.)).
105. Id.
106. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is a body
established pursuant to Article 17 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to oversee the implementation of the provisions
of the treaty. Composed of twenty-three experts, the Committee essentially "acts as a
monitoring system to oversee the implementation of the Convention by those States which
have ratified or acceded to it." See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Fact Sheet No. 22, Discrimination Against Women: The Convention and the Committee
(Order of June 25, 1993), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs22.htm#implementing.
107. In its concluding observation in response to a report submitted by the
Democratic Republic of Congo, the CEDAW Committee stated that "[t]he Committee is
concerned at the persistence of traditional customs and practices which are violations of
women's fundamental rights, such as dowry, the levirate, polygamy, forced marriage and
female genital mutilation." See Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Concluding Observations: Democratic Republic of the Congo (Order of Jan. 2,
2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cedaw/congo2000.html.
108. Id.
109. WOMANAID COLLECTIVE, WOMEN AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN NIGERIA 30,
http://www.wacolnigeria.org/womenand-childrenright.doc (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
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invalid and unenforceable.110 The Court of Appeal noted that "[t]he custom
legalizes fornication as the woman, outside the bounds of marriage is free
to procreate ... without the benefit of a husband recognized by law"' and
that it "inhibits the God given right of marriage. ' 12 The Court further
observed that the custom was discriminatory in the sense that "[a] daughter
with the custom performed on her has the upper-hand over the others
without it. She can inherit while the others without the same cannot
inherit." 3 The Court also found the custom discriminatory because it was
designed to prefer one sex to the other and "[was] a window dressing
designed to oppress and cheat the women-folk." ' 14 Ultimately, the Court
concluded that the Nrachi custom was repugnant to natural justice, equity
and good conscience and therefore unenforceable." 5  In a damning
criticism of the custom, the learned judge Fabiyi, J.C.A. observed:
The polity, as presently constituted, cannot.., contain what Nrachi
custom stands for. It is not neat. It is an antithesis to that which is
wholesome and forward looking. It cannot and should not, be
allowed to rear its ugly head any longer. It should die a natural
death and be buried .... The custom is perfidious and the
petrifying odour smells to high heavens. It is an old time custom.
And, "behold, the old order must change and become new."
'"16
Despite the decision of the Nigerian courts in the above cases,
posthumous procreation in all its variations continues in various parts of
Igboland. " 7  The prevalence of these practices despite judicial
condemnation suggests a wide gap between law and reality and a silent
resistance to the imposition of what some view as Western laws and values.
C. THE REPUGNANCY PRINCIPLE: A CRITIQUE
Although the repugnancy test has on occasion enabled courts in Nigeria
to invalidate questionable customary practices, the continued application of
this inherited colonial principle in post-colonial Africa is fraught with
problems.
First, the repugnancy principle gives the courts "very wide discretion to
sift the customary law and to say what should and should not be woven into
the fabric of the law of the land."'" 8 Overly liberal application of the
repugnancy principle allows individual judges to arbitrarily supplant






116. Muojekwu v. Ejikeme, [2000] 5 N.W.L.R. 402, 422-23 (Nig.).
117. See Obi, supra note 10.
118. N.M. Ollenu, The Influence of English Law on West Afica, 5 J. AFR. L. 21, 27 (1961).
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societal rules and customs without reference to the justification for the rules
and customs, the effectiveness of the rules and customs, or the preferences
of the individuals governed by such rules and customs. Although the
Nigerian Supreme Court has expressly warned against too liberal an
application of the repugnancy clause, 19 courts do not appear to have taken
this warning seriously.
Second, the repugnancy principle is arguably a tool for hegemonic
control of African laws and regulations. The repugnancy test allows
colonial courts to subjugate African customary laws to British laws and
values and to impose Western conceptions of morality on Africans. 2°
According to the late Right Honorable Sir Sidney Abraham in a 1948
lecture, "[m]orality and justice must of course mean British and not African
conceptions of those attributes. Were that not so British justice would be
looking in two different directions at once."' 121 Furthermore, in the words
of a one-time colonial officer in Nigeria, "[t]he attitude of the English
Lawyer towards African law and custom is not that of adaptation but
contempt for a worthless thing, which should be abandoned and replaced
by European law whole and undefiled., 122  In post-colonial Africa, the
continued application of the repugnancy test perpetuates the idea that the
legitimacy of African customary law is hinged not on acceptance by the
local population but on their conformity with Western values and ideals. 1
23
Third, absent clear guidelines for the application of the repugnancy
principle, legal uncertainties and inconsistent decisions result as individual
judges impose their subjective opinions on unfortunate Africans. 124  In
essence, "[n]o one knew beforehand when the application of a customary
law could be halted."'' 25 It was and remains "difficult to point to any clear
and succinct criteria by which the courts enforce or reject a custom on the
grounds of repugnancy., 126  Since opinions differ, as F.A. Ajayi rightly
notes, unless applied with some caution, the repugnancy principle may
prove to be "a very unruly horse" which may carry its rider "he knows not
where." 27 The problem is that the meaning of the repugnancy doctrine is
not altogether clear. It is not clear what "natural justice," "equity," and
"good conscience" mean. 28 Is the phrase "natural justice, equity and good
119. Ollenu, supra note 118, at 27 (observing that "[l]ike all discretions given to a
court, this discretion has been exercised with great judicial care.").
120. Okereafoezeke, supra note 81.
121. Sidney Abrahams, The Colonial Legal Service and the Administration of Justice
in the Colonial Dependencies, 30 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 1, 8 (1948).
122. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 55, at 585.
123. Okereafoezeke, supra note 81.
124. Eshugbayi, Chief Oloto v. Dawuda & Ors., [1904] 1 N.L.R. 58 (Nig.).
125. Yakubu, supra note 52, at 218.
126. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 55, at 584.
127. Ajayi, supra note 77, at 103.
128. Id. (observing that the terms are high-sounding and that it would not be easy to
offer a strict and accurate definition of the terms).
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conscience" interpreted disjunctively? Do the words "natural justice,"
"equity," and "good conscience" mean the same thing? Adding to the
confusion is the appeal to higher law. Of the confusion that the repugnancy
test generates, Daniels aptly observed:
When we look for the meaning of equity in the broad sense, we are
told that it is equivalent to natural justice. When we try to
ascertain the meaning of natural justice we are told that it is
practically equivalent to equity in the popular sense. Then both are
said to mean natural law. At this juncture we re-enter the realm of
uncertainties, but one thing is being made clear: It is that the theory
of assigning specific meanings to each of the phrases in the context
just quoted is untenable .... Even though equity is not
synonymous with good conscience.., yet it can be said that the
meaning of equity in the broad sense embraces almost all, if not,
all, the "concept of good conscience." Therefore in the phrase
"equity and good conscience," the words "good conscience" can be
regarded as superfluous. 129
A fourth problem arises since the repugnancy clause only provides a
tool for invalidating questionable customary practices and does not address
loopholes in the law that are created when laws and practices are voided.
In other words, the role of the court is simply to invalidate a custom but not
to modify it. As the Privy Council observed in a 1931 case, "the Court
cannot itself transform a barbarous custom into a milder one. If it still
,,130stands in its barbarous character, it must be rejected as repugnant ....
Should the repugnancy principle be abolished? Not necessarily.
However, a restrictive application of the repugnancy principle is called for.
There are two possibilities: First, continued application of the repugnancy
test by the courts subject to clear conditions and guidelines from
democratically elected legislatures; second, abolish the repugnancy
principle and allow only elected legislative officials to decide when and
how to abolish questionable customary rules and practices. Regarding the
first proposition, to prevent the use of the repugnancy principle as a pretext
for arbitrarily discarding customary laws, a bill of rights enshrined in a
national constitution could be used to provide clear standards for evaluating
customary laws and practices.' Moreover, in deciding whether to
129. W.C. EKOW DANIELS, THE COMMON LAW IN WEST AFRICA 270-71 (Butterworth
& Co. 1964).
130. Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nig. No. 2,
[1931] 3 N.I.L.R. 24 (Nig.).
131. In 1998, the Law Commission of South Africa argued for the repeal of the
repugnancy test based on the argument that the repugnancy test has been superseded by the
South African Bill of Rights. As noted in a South African Law Commission Discussion
Paper, the repugnancy test is "a clear reflection of the ethnocentric bias in South Africa's
legal system." S. AFRICAN LAW COMM'N, THE HARMONISATION OF THE COMMON LAW AND
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invalidate a given law, courts could be required to take into consideration:
(1) the nature of the customary law in question; (2) the effect of non-
application of the custom on the affected society; (3) the competing rights
implicated by the law or practice; and (4) the general opinion of individuals
governed by the custom in question. With respect to posthumous
procreation, it is also necessary to consider the fundamental need for the
survival and existence of a society through a viable and sustainable
procreation policy.
The repugnancy principle could be removed entirely from the province
of the judiciary. This is not a call for complete immunity for customary
laws and practices, as is the case in some countries in Africa where
customary law is exempt from the reach of constitutional rights
standards. 32 In most countries in Africa, elected representatives have the
responsibility to abolish questionable customary laws and practices.
133
Laws have been adopted in Nigeria and other countries in Africa expressly
abolishing certain customary law rules and practices.
134
In the final analysis, the consequences of declaring a given custom
unenforceable and invalid must always be borne in mind. To set aside a
given custom or practice is in effect to fundamentally alter the culture and
way of life of a people.
IV. POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION, CULTURE AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
This section offers a critique of PPAS. Three areas of concern are
highlighted: concerns about children, concerns about public health and
safety, and concerns about the welfare of women in Africa. First, troubling
questions arise when the fates of children who are the products of these
practices are carefully evaluated. Second, to the extent that PPAS is a
direct consequence of a patriarchal culture that places a premium on the
male child and gives voice primarily to men, African women have cause to
be concerned. Finally, in the context of the AIDS epidemic in Africa, the
wisdom of practices that sanction extramarital sex must be rethought from
the standpoint of public order, public health, and the overall welfare of the
society.
THE INDIGENOUS LAW: CONFLICTS OF LAW 40 (1998).
132. In countries such as Gambia, Zimbabwe, and Sierra Leone, customary law has a
level of constitutional immunity from constitutional rights challenges. A good example is
Section 23 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. Under Articles 23(3)(a) and 23(3)(b) of the
Constitution, customary laws and practices are exempt from the application of the
provisions of the Constitution prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. Chidi Anselm
Odinkalu, Informal Responses to Access to Human Rights, INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICY 7 (2003).
133. Id. (inferring that customary laws should be abolished if they do not meet a test
of "normative content -' repugnancy test.').
134. Id. at 7-8.
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A. PPAS AND THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN IN AFRICA
The biggest problem with PPAS is that the resulting children are
denied the paternity of their natural fathers 35 and do not enjoy real fatherly
love throughout their lifetime. In bygone years when the extended family
network was strong and there were many male relatives who were able and
willing to assume the role of a father, this may not have posed a problem.
However, given growing individualism, the idea of children growing up
without father figures is troubling.
First, the care and responsibility for posthumous children in Africa
rests primarily on the mothers, contrary to Article 18(1) of the Convention
on the Right of the Child (CRC), pursuant to which State Parties undertake
to "use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both
parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development
of the child."'1
3 6
Second, given the grim statistics on the fate of children in female-
headed households, 137 any custom that may encourage the formation of
female-headed households deserves strict scrutiny. In many parts of
Africa, female-headed households are the most vulnerable to food
insecurity and bear the brunt of poverty. 138  The Community and
Household Surveillance (CHS) study, released by the Consortium for
Southern Africa's Food Emergency (C-SAFE) and the World Food
135. In Muojekwo & Ors. v. Ejikeme & Ors., the Nigerian Court of Appeal struck
down the nrachi custom as repugnant to natural justice in part because, according to the
court, "the children born to a daughter in respect of whom the ceremony is performed are
denied the paternity of their natural father." See Muojekwo & Ors. v. Ejikeme & Ors.,
[1999] 5 N.W.L.R. 402 (Nig.), summaries available at http://www.worldlii.org//cgi-
bin/disp.pl/int/cases/ICHRL/1999/168.html?query-muojekwo.
136. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art 18(1) G.A. Res.
44/25, annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989),
available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/child.html [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of
the Child].
137. See generally Mayra Buvinic & Geeta Rao Gupta, Female-Headed Households
and Female-Maintained Families: Are They Worth Targeting to Reduce Poverty in
Developing Countries? 45 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE No. 2 259, 267 (1997); Eileen
Kennedy & Lawrence Haddad, Are Pre-schoolers From Female-Headed Households Less
Malnourished? A Comparative Analysis of Results from Ghana and Kenya, 30 J. OF DEV.
STUD. No. 3 680, 684-85 (1994); Cynthia B. Lloyd & Anastasia J. Gage-Brandon, Women's
Role in Maintaining Households: Family Warfare and Sexual Inequality in Ghana, 47
POPULATION STUD. No. 1 115 (1993), available at http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-
4728%28199303%2947%3Al%3Cl15%3AWRIMHF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E; Sonalde Desai,
Children at Risk: The Role of Family Structure in Latin America and West Africa, 18
POPULATION & DEV. REV. No. 4 689, 702 (1992).
138. See also Buvinic & Gupta, supra note 137; Sherrie KoSsoudji & Eva Mueller,
The Economic and Demographic Status of Female-Headed Households in Rural Botswana,
31 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE No. 4 831, 843 (1983); F. Catherine Johnson &
Beatrice Lorge Rogers, Children's Nutritional Status in Female-Headed Households in the
Dominican Republic, 37 Soc. ScI. & MED. No. 12 1293, 1294-95 (1993); Ellen L. Bassuk et
al., Homelessness in Female-Headed Families: Childhood and Adult Risk and Protective
Factors, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 241, 241 (1997).
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Programme (WFP), is instructive. 39  Based on information gathered in
October 2003 and March 2004, the study analyzed the livelihood and food
security status of households and vulnerable groups in three southern
African countries. 40 The study found that in Zimbabwe, "[a]mong several
vulnerable groups, including households with a chronically ill, disabled or
orphaned member, female-headed households were more prone to
vulnerability than their male counterparts,"' 4'  and "[n]inety percent of all
female-headed households fell into two or more vulnerable categories,
while only [thirty-nine] percent of their male counterparts were in the same
situation. ',142  How might posthumous procreation affect the welfare of
children, especially in countries where governments assume no
responsibility whatsoever for the care and development of children and
where social welfare programs are nonexistent?
Third, it is not particularly clear who, besides the mothers, is
responsible for the care and upbringing of posthumous children in Africa.
Arguably, the extended family is responsible. However, the precise
responsibility of the extended family is vague and ill-defined at best. 43 Is
the responsibility of the extended family conditioned on the continuing
loyalty and good behavior of the mothers of these children? What happens
if the extended family shirks its responsibility? These questions are
pertinent because the CRC envisages that the primary responsibility for the
upbringing of children should fall on parents and guardians and not on the
state; 144 states only play a supporting role. 45  The problem is that
customary laws in Africa have no institutionalized oversight
mechanisms. 46 Like most aspects of customary laws, the efficacy of rules
relating to guardianship of children is "ultimately underwritten by the
personal honesty and integrity of elders and by continued legitimacy in the
eyes of the community."'
14 7
Fourth, the psychological health of the children who are the product of
PPAS is rarely, if ever, considered. However, as McWhinnie and Bisset
139. Health System Trust, Southern Africa: Female-Headed Households Most





143. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 136, at art. 5.
144. Id. at art. 18(1) ("The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the
primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions
of living necessary for the child's development.").
145. Id. at art. 27(3) ("States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and
within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible
for the child to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and
support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.").
146. See Odinkalu, supra note 132, at 12.
147. Id.
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rightly observe, children "can experience psychological problems in
childhood, at adolescence and as adults directly related to the methods used
in their creation."'' 48  Problems abound regardless of whether the
circumstances of a child's birth are publicized or kept secret. Publicized,
posthumous children sometimes become the target of village jokes and
snide remarks. Kept secret, the problem arises of attempting to foster a
stable, nurturing and long-lasting personal relationship built on a bedrock
of secrecy.
B. POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION AND THE WELFARE OF AFRICAN WOMEN
PPAS also implicates women's rights. First, the need for posthumous
reproduction frequently arises because a man died without a surviving male
child. To continue the lineage, the custom makes a provision for
reproduction of a male descendant by any means possible. 149 The practice
arguably perpetuates the idea that girls are inferior to boys and that men are
more relevant in a family than women, contrary to the spirit and letter of
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). °50  Under Article 2 of CEDAW, State Parties
"condemn discrimination against women in all its forms," and "agree to
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women .... State Parties undertake, pursuant to
Article 5 of CEDAW, to:
[M]odify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.1
5 2
Second, PPAS may also encourage violence against women, although
no empirical studies exist to date to support this position. Frequently, it is
the male members of a man's family who take or approve the decision
148. SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WRITTEN EVIDENCE,
MEMORANDUM FROM DR. ALEXINA MCWHINNIE AND PROFESSOR ALASTAIR BISSETT, App. 87
art. 1.06, 2004.
149. See IFAD, Gender Mainstreaming in IFAD Supported Projects in West and
Central Africa, available at http://www.ifad.org/gender/progress/pa/pa_-2.htm (last modified
Apr. 12, 2007) (observing that in the majority of West and Central African countries, land is
inherited patrilineally or is allocated to males according to lineage).
150. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180/Annex, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. 34/180-79
(Dec. 18, 1979) (."[D]iscrimination against women' means any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms




about the need and modalities of posthumous conception. 153  In such
situations, the wishes of the woman involved may be ignored or forgotten.
Much would depend on whether the woman involved is able to negotiate
who the biological father will be. Where the choice is made by the family
members and not the woman, one can envisage rape, humiliation, and
forced impregnation. Given the primacy of the family in the traditional
legal system in Africa, the well-being of widows may be subordinated to
the preservation of the family and the conservation of its authority.
Third, hinged as it is on widow inheritance, PPAS raises concerns
about the overall welfare of widows in Africa because it commodifies and
objectifies poor African women and subjects them to the whims and
caprices of unscrupulous relatives. 154 Admittedly, in some cases, widows
willingly accept the offer of a levirate marriage or other arrangements in
order to produce children to carry the dead husband's name. However,
such decisions are usually a result of the precarious position of childless
widows in Africa. Frequently, posthumous reproduction is the only
mechanism available for a widow to protect her husband's property and
safeguard the interest of any surviving children, particularly female
children. 155 PPAS thus masks the plight of widows and prevents more
serious efforts at addressing the situation of widows on the continent.
Fourth, posthumous procreation could indirectly sentence widows to a
lifetime of poverty and servitude because a widow could find herself with
children but with no means of support. Customary laws in Africa
emphasize duty and responsibility as the basis for entitlements.
156
Consequently, a widow could be easily deserted by family members and
left to fend for herself and her children if she is seen to be challenging the
status quo. PPAS does not guarantee support or protection for a widow.
C. POSTHUMOUS PROCREATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN AFRICA
PPAS raises important questions about the sexual reproductive rights
of women and the range of inequalities and customary practices that drive
the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa today. Does PPAS encourage
promiscuity and the sharing of partners? Do customary practices that put
pressure on women to have children outside the boundaries of a
monogamous marriage relationship heighten their vulnerability to
HIV/AIDS? Do customary practices that encourage men to "donate" their
sperm ultimately expose the men, their wives and the donee to HIV
infection? While these questions might have been ignored in bygone years,
153. See generally, MEEK, supra note 11, at 320-21 (explaining that men are
typically the decision makers regarding a dead man's estate, which includes his wives).
154. Id. at 371.
155. Marriage Rules: Part II, supra note 25.
156. See generally, MEEK, supra note 11, at 320-21 (explaining how rules of
inheritance are structured in order to allow one family member, usually the oldest son, to
care for the rest of the family).
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they can no longer be ignored in the wake of HIV/AIDS and the finding
that multi-partnered sexual behavior increases the risk of HIV infection.
57
PPAS arguably encourages multi-sexual behavior and may increase the
spread of HIV in Africa.158  In Okonkwo v. Okagbue, the
plaintiff/appellants successfully argued that "to marry a woman for a dead
and non-existent man will amount to giving the woman license to have
indiscriminate sexual intercourse especially where children are expected
from such [an] absurd union."'' 59 Although in theory, a woman may have
the right to decide who she will sleep with in order to have children for her
dead husband, the truth is that "[w]hen it comes to decision making in
relationships, men are expected to dominate and women to be passive. ''1 60
Tallis rightly notes that "[u]nequal parties are not in a position to negotiate
when they have sex, how often and how they can protect themselves from
sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and HIV.' 16 1 This observation is
even more pertinent when the woman involved is a widow. As noted in an
earlier work, widows are very vulnerable in Africa - vulnerability that is
fueled by poverty, illiteracy, and uncertainties about a future with no
husband. 62  Because the HIV/AIDS epidemics "are at their worst in
regions where poverty and economic inequality is extensive and gender
inequality is pervasive and access to public service is weak and
uncertain,'1 63 practices that exacerbate the vulnerabilities of women and
children must always be carefully evaluated.
157. See generally John C. Caldwell et al., The Social Context of AIDS in sub-
Saharan Africa, 15 POPULATION & DEV. REV, 185 (1989); John C. Caldwell et al., Changes
in the Nature and Levels of Sexual Networking in an African Society: The Destabilization of
the Traditional Yoruba System, (Australian Nat'l Univ., Working Paper No. 4, 1990).
158. See generally John C. Caldwell et al., The Role of High-Risk Occupations in the
Spread of AIDS: Truck Drivers and Itinerant Market Women in Nigeria 19 INT'L FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 43, 47-48 (1993); Christine Oppong, A High Price to Pay: for Education,
Subsistence or a Place in the Job Market, 5 HEALTH TRANSITION REV. 35, 41-42 (1995);
James P.M. Ntozi, Widowhood, Remarriage and Migration During the HIV/AIDS Epidemic
in Uganda, 7 HEALTH TRANSITION REV. 125, 128 (1997) (suggesting that cultural practices
such as the levirate marriage may increase the spread of HIV); see also J.R.S. Malungo,
Challenges to Sexual Behavioural Changes in the Era of AIDS: Sexual Cleansing and
Levirate Marriage in Zambia, in RESISTANCES TO BEHAVIOURAL CHANGES TO REDUCE
HIV/AIDS INFECTION 41, 41 (1999).
159. Okonkwo v. Okagbue and 2 Others, [1994] 12 N.S.C.C. 40 (Nig.).
160. VIccI TALLIS, GENDER AND HIV/AIDS: OVERVIEW REPORT 2 (Bridge
Publications 2002), available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/bridge/reports/CEP-HIV-report.pdf.
161. Id.
162. See generally Uch6 U. Ewelukwa, Post-Colonialism, Gender and Customary
Injustice: Widows in African Societies, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 424,452 n.94 (2002).
163. TALLIS, supra note 160, at 2.
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V. TO REPEAL OR NOT TO REPEAL: INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS MEET ENTRENCHED
CUSTOMARY PRACTICES
Judged from an international human rights standpoint, PPAS raises
many troubling questions. However, a hasty application of international
human rights law (IHRL) to PPAS could be problematic and ultimately
counterproductive. This section examines the strengths and weaknesses of
deploying international human rights norms in any attempt to reform
African customs relating to posthumous procreation.
A. STRENGTHS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
Unlike the repugnancy test, international human rights law offers a set
of clearly defined legal standards by which questionable customary laws
and practices may be evaluated. Arguably, the international human rights
framework avoids the vagueness that surrounds the repugnancy test and
may thus curtail unreasonable exercise of judicial discretion. Second, the
widespread ratification of international human rights treaties by states in
Africa arguably means greater acceptance and legitimacy of IHRL in
Africa. The CRC is a prime example; with the exception of Somalia, all
African countries have ratified the CRC. 164 Third, the fact that African
states have adopted key regional human rights treaties also strengthens the
case for using human rights norms in reform efforts on the continent. Key
regional treaties adopted in Africa to date include the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights,165 the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child, 166 and the Protocol to the African Charter on the
Rights of Women in Africa.
67
B. WEAKNESSES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
There are several problems associated with using IHRL in reform
efforts in Africa. First, the human rights framework often yields
contradictory results and may impose hidden costs on a society, that is, the
costs associated with abolishing an entrenched customary practice.
Second, the human rights framework frequently generates resistance on the
ground in part because of the biased approach to reform efforts by human
rights advocates. Although PPAS clearly implicates numerous
164. See Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
Ratifications of the Principle International Human Rights Treaties, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
165. Organization of African Unity, African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights,
June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 (1982).
166. Organization of African Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990).
167. African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights, Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, CAB/LEG/66.6
(Sept. 13, 2000), reprinted in 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 40 (2001).
[Vol. 19:2
internationally guaranteed human rights, problems arise when human rights
advocates condemn practices originating in non-Western societies without
critiquing arguably comparable practices in the West.
1. Contradictory Results/Cost to Society
The application of IHRL to PPAS may lead to the invalidation of age-
old customary rules and practices. When customs are abruptly invalidated,
the resulting gaps in societal rules and regulations could be very
problematic as other guaranteed rights may be violated in the process. For
example, based on the argument that widow inheritance is a traditional
mechanism for protecting widows, prohibiting widow's inheritance could
potentially increase the spread of HIV/AIDS by creating a whole class of
unmarried, unattached, and extremely vulnerable widows. Without the
protection and support that widows' inheritance offers, widows could be
forced to engage in high-risk sexual behavior in order to support
themselves and their children.
Children may also be affected by any decision to abruptly abolish
PPAS. For example, the decision in Okonkwo v. Okagbue, in which the
Nigerian Supreme Court invalidated the customary law relating to ghost
marriage, has the potential to negatively affect millions of posthumously
born children - children who, until the decision was rendered, viewed
themselves and were viewed by their society as legitimate members of their
extended family. 
168
Although the CRC does not speak specifically about posthumous
children, 169 it lays down principles that apply to such children. Of
particular importance are the principles of non-discrimination (Article 2)
and the best interest of the child (Article 3). The consequences of declaring
a long-established custom invalid may be to create a whole new category of
"illegitimate" and stigmatized children. In Article 2 of the CRC, state
parties undertake to "respect and ensure" the rights set forth in the
convention "to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of
any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal
guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other
status., 170 Furthermore, Article 2(2) provides that state parties "shall take
all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all
forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status ... of the
child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.",171  Article 3(1)
168. Okonkwo v. Okagbue and 2 Others, [1994] 12 N.S.C.C. 40 (Nig.).
169. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 136, art. 1 ("For the purposes
of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen
years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.").
170. Id. at art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
171. Id. at art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
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provides that "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration."'' 72 One solution may be for posthumous children
in Nigeria and the rest of Africa to become wards of states protected in
accordance with Article 3(2) of the CRC. 173 It is unlikely, however, that
the Nigerian government would be willing or able to assume full
responsibility for the thousands of children who are likely to be affected.
A ruling that renders thousands of children illegitimate may also affect
the survival and development of a child and thus implicate Article 6 of the
CRC, which states that "States Parties recognize that every child has the
inherent right to life" and "shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the
survival and development of the child."' 174 The decision in Okonkwo v.
Okagbue also arguably denies a child the right to a name, contrary to
Article 7(1) which states that "[t]he child shall be registered immediately
after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name ... and, as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. 175 Every
child has a right to preserve his or her identity, and it is the duty of State
Parties to the CRC to respect the right of the child in this respect.
176
To abruptly invalidate posthumous procreation in Africa could mean
that thousands of children may be forcibly removed from their homes and
their extended family network, in violation of Article 9 of the CRC. Article
9 states that, "States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated
from his or her parents against their will, except when competent
authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with
applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the
best interests of the child."' 177  One can imagine a situation where a
posthumous child is living with a father's relative who turns out not to be
his relative based on the Supreme Court decision holding that the living
cannot contract marriage for the dead.178 Even if removal is ultimately the
best solution, several thorny questions inevitably arise. First, will all
affected children be given the opportunity to participate in termination
172. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 136, at art. 3(1) (emphasis
added).
173. Id. at art. 3(2) ("States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and
care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his
or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and,
to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.").
174. Id. at art. 6(1), 6(2).
175. Id. at art. 7(1) (emphasis added).
176. Id. at art. 8(1) ("States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to
preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized
by law without unlawful interference.").
177. Id. at art. 9(1).
178. See Okonkwo v. Okagbue and 2 Others, [1994] 12 N.S.C.C. 40 (Nig.).
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proceedings in accordance with Article 9(2)? 179 Will such children be
permitted to maintain any form of relationship with the family they once
thought was theirs, as required by Article 9(3)?180 Will the children be
allowed to express their views regarding their fate, as required by Article
12? Article 12(1) clearly states that State Parties "shall assure to the child
who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those
views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child."0
81
Finally, even if the children are removed from their homes, what type of
protection will be afforded them? The question is pertinent because Article
20(1) of the CRC provides that, "[a] child temporarily or permanently
deprived of his or her family environment ... shall be entitled to special
protection and assistance provided by the state." 182 Under Article 20, State
Parties are expected to ensure the availability of alternative care for
children deprived of their family environment. 183
In countries where children already suffer from family and societal
neglect and the "street children" phenomenon is on the rise, a decision that
renders thousands of children illegitimate may lead to an increase in the
trafficking of children.1 84 The rights of children to associate with family
members and be part of village associations, such as the age-grade
association and masquerade, will inevitably be affected contrary to Article
15 of the CRC.1 15 Finally, the abrupt abolition of age-old customs relating
179. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 136, at art. 9(2) ("In any
proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 of the present article, all interested parties shall be
given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views known.").
180. Id. at art. 9(3) ("States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is
separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with
both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests.").
181. Id. at art. 12(2) ("For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the
opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child,
either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent
with the procedural rules of national law."); Id. at art. 13(1) ("The child shall have the right
to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print,
in the form of art, or through any other media of the child's choice.").
182. Id. at art. 20(1).
183. See id. at art. 20(2); id. at art. 20(3) ("Such care could include, inter alia, foster
placement, kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institutions
for the care of children. When considering solutions, due regard shall be paid to the
desirability of continuity in a child's upbringing and to the child's ethnic, religious, cultural
and linguistic background.").
184. Id. at art. 11(1) ("States Parties shall take measures to combat the illicit transfer
and non-return of children abroad.").
185. Id. at art. 15(1) ("States Parties recognize the rights of the child to freedom of
association and to freedom of peaceful assembly."); id. at art. 15(2) ("[n]o restrictions may
be placed on the exercise of these rights other than those imposed in conformity with the
law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.").
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to posthumous procreation could raise questions about possible interference
with the privacy rights of posthumous children. Article 16 of the CRC
provides that "[n]o child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to unlawful attacks on his or her ... honour and reputation."' 8 6 Article
16(2) provides that the child "has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks."
18 7
Overall, with hundreds and possibly thousands of children abruptly
denied a family name and the protection of the extended family, the
survival and development of many children could be seriously
jeopardized. 188 For one thing, the social security benefits of children
involved will be affected, because in traditional societies the extended
family system serves as the child's social security. 189  Other areas of
concern include the right to health,' 90 the right to education,' 9' freedom
from economic exploitation, the risk of sexual exploitation and other forms
of exploitation, 192 and the risk of a rise in the sale of, or traffic in,
children.' 93
2. A Biased Human Rights Framework
If the notion of human rights is a Western concept as some scholars
contend' 94 and if international human rights treaties are expressions of their
predominantly Western constituencies, caution is required in the manner in
which human rights norms are deployed in crusading against practices in
non-Western societies. Until the normative universality of human rights is
fully realized, applying human rights in societies across the globe will
require care, caution, and dialogue. Moreover, there is an urgent need to
186. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 136, at art. 16(1).
187. Id. at art. 16(2).
188. Id. at art. 27(1) ("States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard
of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social
development.").
189. Id. at art. 26(1) ("States Parties shall recognize for every child the right to
benefit from social security, including social insurance, and shall take the necessary
measures to achieve the full realization of this right in accordance with their national law.").
190. Id. at art. 24(1) ("States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and
rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his
or her right of access to such health care services.").
191. Id. at art. 28(1) ("States Parties recognize the right of the child to
education .... ).
192. Id. at art. 36 ("States Parties shall protect the child against all other forms of
exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child's welfare.").
193. Id. at art. 35 ("States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and
multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any
purpose or in any form.").
194. See generally THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Joan R. Bauer
& Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999). See also MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL CRITIQUE 11 (Univ. of Penn. Press 2002).
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rid international human rights discourse of the double standard that
currently affects it, seen in the obsession with practices in non-Western
societies and blind indifference to arguably comparable practices in
Western societies. The problem, Odinkalu rightly observed, is that "[t]here
is a triumphalist and confusing ambivalence in the relationship of formal
human rights systems and mechanisms of non-formal systems."'
' 95
Odinkalu goes on to observe that this ambivalence which is both racially
constructed and paternalistic, "has its origin in an erroneously racialized
understanding of non-formal authorities as only existing in non-Western,
'under-developed' societies of the hemispheric South, or among
'indigenous' minorities of the Northern Half."
'1 96
Regarding posthumous procreation, the problem is that the work of the
CEDAW Committee involves a certain degree of institutional blindness.
By focusing on posthumous procreation in Africa while disregarding
posthumous procreation in the West, the CEDAW Committee
unintentionally widens the gap between the West and the rest of the
world.' 97 Arguably, it is morally wrong for the CEDAW Committee to
criticize the practices of one culture unless it is similarly critical of
comparable practices that occur in other cultures. This is not to suggest
that the African approach to posthumous conception is morally on par with
the Western approach to posthumous reproduction using ARTs. In many
respects, cultures are hardly commensurable. However, while there are
basic differences in the two approaches, from the standpoint of the welfare
of posthumous children in general, the two approaches are quite
comparable. Exclusive focus on practices in non-Western cultures makes
cross-cultural conversations more difficult and stifles the process of
multicultural exchange.
3. A Paternalistic Approach in Human Rights Work
International human rights norms evoke images of the repugnancy test
effectively utilized by some colonial powers to invalidate African laws and
practices. Indeed, "the repugnancy test could today easily approximate to a
test of compatibility with human rights norms."'198 Perceived to be an
extension of imperial colonial policies whereby everything African was
considered inferior and in need of reform, forced application of
international human rights norms inevitably generates resistance on the
ground. The fact that customary laws "enjoy the kind of legitimacy that is
not accorded formal sources of human rights norms in the communities to
195. Odinkalu, supra note 132.
196. Id.
197. Yael Tamir, Hands Off Clitoridectomy, BOSTON REV. (1996), available at
http:/Ibostonreview.net/BR21.3/Tamir.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) (arguing that the
condemnation of female genital mutilation in the West intentionally widens the gap between
the Western culture and those in which clitoridectomy is practiced).
198. Odinkalu, supra note 132, at 7.
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which they are applicable"' 99 is not fully appreciated by human rights
advocates anxious for change. The result is a great divide between human
rights practitioners and the people on the ground whose lives are regulated
by non-formal laws and systems. With respect to PPAS, for example, there
are several economic factors that contribute to the survival of the practice.
The most important factor is the need to safeguard family property and
ensure that wealth remains within the family - transferred from one
generation of males to another.200  Second, because the ability to have
children is one of the grounds on which the extended family extends care
and protection to widows, poor infertile women in Africa will readily resort
to PPAS if they lack independent access to property and income.20  Thus,
one obstacle to reforming PPAS in Africa is the fact that many women in
the continent willingly embrace the practice and view it as a solution to
their problems - the problem of childlessness, the problems associated
with widowhood, and the problem of poverty. Third, poverty and lack of
access to modem technology also means that cryopreservation of sperm
and artificial insemination as practiced in the West are out of the reach of
most African women. Without access to new technologies available in the
West, the present approach to posthumous conception in Africa is likely to
continue.
In conclusion, although customary laws and practices can operate to
constrain individual freedom and access to human rights, forced or hasty
abolition of age-old laws and practices can be counter-productive,
polarizing, and costly. "Bound up as they are in the construction of
personal and communal identities," attempts to reform customary law,
Odinkalu rightly notes, "could easily become both combustible and
counter-productive if not managed with care., 20 2 Human rights advocates
must appreciate the fact that customary laws in Africa emphasize duty and
responsibility rather than individual rights and tread wisely.
VI. WESTERN APPROACH TO POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION:
TOWARDS A CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE
In the West, advances in technology are providing new opportunities
for women to conceive and bear children long after the death of their male
partners. Indeed, new technology allows experts to retrieve sperm from
terminally ill, brain-dead and even clinically dead men and to store the
199. Odinkalu, supra note 132, at 9.
200. Jeevan Vasagar, Where Death Eats Up the Means of Life: Lavish Funeral
Practices and Family Traditions Are More Than Kenya's Luo, THE GUARDLAN, Jan. 10,
2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jan/10/kenya.jeevanvasagar.
201. See generally, Ewelukwa, supra note 162, at 454-56 (explaining that some
Nigerian tribes' customs and laws do not allow widows to inherit, favoring children and
other relatives instead).
202. Odinkalu, supra note 132, at 13.
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materials so removed for later use.2 °3 Cryopreservation of sperm allows for
artificial insemination by a male partner regardless of whether he is dead or
alive.20 4  Overall, retrieval of sperm from dead or brain-dead persons
enables individuals and families to preserve the "bloodline" through
subsequent artificial insemination.0 5
Posthumous conception and reproduction using advanced technologies
raises many thorny and troubling questions. While it is now possible in the
West to avoid the more primitive approaches to posthumous procreation,
PPWS is nevertheless a deviation from the norm. In legal battles in
countries such as the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and
France, courts have grappled and are still grappling with new issues raised
by PPWS such as whether a judge can or should authorize the retrieval of
sperm from a dead man and whether children conceived posthumously can
be recognized as the legal heirs of their dead father.20 6  Surprisingly,
despite the important ethical questions surrounding the practice of
posthumous retrieval, storage and use of sperm from dead men, the practice
has thus far not been a subject of consideration by international human
rights organizations.
There is clearly a hierarchy of preferred methods of sperm collection
from a husband for insemination procedures. Regarding PPWS, three
situations typically encountered are: (1) retrieval and cryopreservation of
sperm for future use at the request of a healthy man facing an infertility
problem (level 1); (2) retrieval and cryopreservation of sperm from a brain-
dead or unconscious man at the request of his wife or girlfriend for possible
future use (level 2); and (3) retrieval and cryopreservation of sperm from a
dead man at the request of his wife or girlfriend for possible future use
(level 3). While all three raise troubling questions, this paper will focus
primarily on PPWS level 3, and to some extent on PPWS level 2.
In this section, I offer an overview of the range of legal issues arising
in countries such as France, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States with respect to posthumous paternity. I also examine the human
rights and public policy issues that are raised. Finally, I compare the
203. Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, The Use of Cryopreserved Sperm and
Pre-Embryos in Contemporary Jewish Law and Ethics, JEWISH LAW, http://www.jlaw.com/
Articles/semen.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008) (observing that death, brain death, and
terminal illness are common circumstances in which electroejaculation for retrieval of
sperm is requested, with requests typically coming from widows, wives, or girlfriends of the
man involved).
204. LORAS BIOETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, IMPERMISSIBLE CASES OF ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION BY HUSBAND (AIH), http://www2.loras.edu/-CatholicHE/Arch/Sexuality/
AIH.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). Also referred to as homologous artificial insemination,
artificial insemination by husbands refers to every technique used to bring about conception
through the transfer into the genital tracts of a married woman of the sperm previously
collected from her husband. Id.
205. Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 203.
206. See infra Section VI. D. of this Article.
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Western approach to posthumous procreation to the African approaches to
the same problem.
A. PRE-MORTEM RETRIEVAL AND POST-MORTEM INSEMINATION
Are spermatozoa a form of property that can be bequeathed in a will or
otherwise freely transferred as the owner deems fit? What ethical questions
arise when sperm is retrieved and cryopreserved at the request of a healthy
male who dies subsequently without designating how his sperm may be
disposed of? Can the deceased wife or significant other use the sperm to
achieve conception posthumously? Should the answer depend on whether
or not the deceased consented to the posthumous use of his sperm?
In a 1984 French case, the issue was whether the wife of a deceased
man could procreate using sperm retrieved while the husband was alive.2 °7
In Parpalaix v. CECOS, Mr. Alain deposited his spermatozoa with the
Centre d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme Humain (CECOS) for
storage, prior to undergoing treatment for his cancer but left no instruction
concerning his spermatozoa in the event of his death.20 8  When Mr.
Parpalaix subsequently died from his illness and his wife sought to use his
sperm for insemination, CECOS refused to release the sperm to her.
20 9
CECOS argued that sperm, as an indivisible part of the body, is not like a
tangible property that can be inherited absent specific instructions from the
sperm donor.21 0 Mrs. Parpalaix sought to treat the sperm as a movable
object subject to ordinary property laws governing movable property.21 1
Applying ordinary contract principles, Mrs. Parpalaix argued that pursuant
to the contract with Mr. Parpalaix, CECOS was bound to return what it had
received.2 12 The Court ruled that its decision must be guided by the intent
of Mr. Parpalaix because sperm is "the genetic expression" of a person's
right to procreate.2 13 Having found that Mr. Parpalaix had intended for his
wife to use the sperm to have their children, the Court ordered CECOS to
deliver the sperm to Mrs. Parpalaix and her doctors for insemination or
destruction.
214
In Centre for Reproductive Medicine v. U., the donor appeared to
consent to the retrieval and storage of his sperm but not the posthumous use
of the sperm by his wife.215 On September 6, 2000, Mrs. U's husband
207. Evelyne Aziza-Shuster, A Child At All Costs: Posthumous Reproduction and the
Meaning of Parenthood, 9 HuM. REPROD. No. 11 2182, 2182-84 (1994) (discussing the case
of Parpaplaix v. CECOS, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Creteil (I Ch. Cir.) Aug. 1, 1984,








215. Centre for Reproductive Medicine v. U., [2002] EWHC (Fam) 36, [2002] Fain.
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signed a consent form agreeing to the retrieval and storage of his sperm.2 16
The sperm was surgically removed on September 7, 2000 and stored with
the Centre for Reproductive Medicine at Bristol University (the Centre).21 7
However, on October 25, 2000, following a consultation with a specialist
nursing sister, Mr. U changed the consent form by withdrawing his consent
to the posthumous use of his sperm.21 8 On January 9, 2001, Mr. U died
tragically and unexpectedly. 219 Following Mr. U's death, the widow sought
to use the sperm collected to achieve pregnancy, but the Centre refused on
the grounds that the deceased did not consent to the posthumous use of his
sperm.22° In an application to the court, the Centre sought an order
permitting it to destroy the deceased's sperm.22' On January 25, 2002, the
President of the Family Division granted the Centre permission to allow
Mr. U's sperm to perish or otherwise to destroy it.222 Mrs. U appealed,
arguing that the original consent given by her deceased husband should
stand because its withdrawal was the result of undue influence.223 The
Court of Appeal denied her appeal, holding that the retrieval and storage of
sperm pursuant to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 is
premised on full and informed consent of the donor.224 The Court of
Appeal further held that, based on the facts of the case, the Centre did not
have effective consent for the continued storage and later use of these
sperm, and Mrs. U did not prove undue influence.225
B. RETRIEVAL AND STORAGE OF SPERM FROM UNCONSCIOUS AND
BRAIN-DEAD INDIVIDUALS
In the United Kingdom and other Western nations, cases are arising
where relatives are requesting the retrieval of sperm from unconscious or
brain-dead men. The English case of R. v. Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood involved a 33 year-old woman's
battle for the right to receive fertility treatment using sperm collected while
her husband, Stephen Blood, was in a coma. 226 Diana Blood and Stephen
Blood married in 1991.227 Towards the end of 1994 they decided to try and
Law 267 (Ct. of App. Eng. & Wales).










226. R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1999]
Fam. 151 (A.C.) (U.K.).
227. R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood, [1997] 2
WLR 806 (Q.B.D.) (U.K.).
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start a family. 28 Unfortunately, on February 26, 1995, Stephen contracted
meningitis and lapsed into a coma.229 While still in a coma, on March 1,
1995, at Diana Blood's request, samples of Stephen's sperm were collected
by electro-ejaculation for possible future use.230 The sperm was collected
and entrusted to the Infertility Research Trust (IRT) for storage as required
by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 (the 1990 Act).231
Stephen died shortly thereafter.232 When Diana Blood subsequently wished
to use the sperm samples for artificial insemination treatment, the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) in the U.K. refused to give
the necessary consent for treatment, citing Section 4(1) and Schedule 3 of
the 1990 Act.233 The relevant provisions require the written consent of a
donor to the use of his sperm.234 In an initial application for judicial review
of the decision of the HFEA, the judge, Sir Stephen Brown P. of the
Queen's Bench Division, dismissed Diana Blood's application on grounds
that Stephen did not consent to the use and storage of his gamete.235 On
further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that, in the absence of the
necessary consent from Stephen, Diana Blood's fertility treatment and the
continued storage of her husband's sperm were prohibited by the relevant
provisions of the 1990 Act.236 However, the Court of Appeal also held that,
as a citizen of the European Community and pursuant to relevant EC
Treaty, Diana Blood "had a directly enforceable right to receive medical
treatment in another member state," and that the HFEA's refusal to
authorize the export of her husband's sperm infringed this right insofar as it
made impossible the fertilization treatment sought.23 7 Diana subsequently
exported her husband's sperm and has since had two children conceived
through artificial insemination.238
In MA W v. Western Sydney Area Health Services, decided on May 3,
2000, a court in Australia declined to consent to the removal of sperm from
a man who was comatose and dying.239 The man in question had suffered
severe brain damage as the result of an accident.240 While the man was on







235. R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood [1996] 3
WLR 1176, 1181 (Q.B.D.) (U.K.).
236. Id.at 1190-91.
237. Id. at 1188.
238. Clare Dyer, Diane Blood to Have Second Child, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 9, 2002,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/story/0,3604,647547,00.html.
239. MAW v. Western Sydney Area Heath Services, (2000) 49 N.S.W.L.R. 231
(N.S.W.); No. BC200003155, 2000 NSW LEXIS 737, *47 (S.C. N.S.W. 2000).
240. Id.
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life support, his wife brought an application seeking the court's permission
for his semen to be extracted through a surgical procedure. 241 The Court
declined, observing that such a procedure was neither for the protection nor
welfare of the comatose patient.242
In the United Kingdom and many other Western countries, therefore, in
deciding whether sperm can be retrieved from a comatose individual and
whether the sperm so removed can be used subsequently, the decision turns
primarily on whether the individual consented to such a procedure; ethics
and morality are largely ignored.
C. POST-MORTEM RETRIEVAL AND INSEMINATION
While the retrieval of sperm from comatose patients is troubling, more
troubling is the practice of retrieving sperm from dead bodies. In Australia
and other Western countries, courts are grappling with the legality of the
practice of retrieving sperm from dead men. AB v. Attorney General of
Victoria involved an urgent application for authorization to retrieve sperm
from a dead man. 43 X, a young man of 29 years, died on Sunday, July 12,
1998, as a result of injuries from a motor vehicle accident. 2 4 At 10:45 a.m.
on Monday, July 13, 1998, X's wife (AB), acting through counsel, made
an application seeking permission for the removal of semen from X's
body.245 X did not leave a will, nor did he express any consent to the
posthumous retrieval of his semen, 46 Justice Gillard of the Supreme Court
of Victoria granted permission for a "legally qualified medical practitioner
to remove spermatozoa and associated tissue from the body of X" and for
the spermatozoa and tissue so removed to be stored in accordance with the
1995 Infertility Treatment Act of Victoria. 247 The time-sensitive nature of
the procedure and the desire to have more time to consider the complexity
of the case were the primary reasons given by the Court for granting the
urgent petition.248 However, Supreme Court Justice Gillard ordered that,
"[t]he spermatozoa and tissue so removed and stored are not to be used for
241. Western Sydney Area Heath Services, (2000) 49 N.S.W.L.R. 231, *11.
242. Id. at *25 ("[Olperative procedures that are not necessary to preserve the life or
ensure improvement or prevent deterioration in the physical or mental health or wellbeing of
an incapable person are not able to be consented to by the Court under its parens patriae
jurisdiction.").
243. AB v. Attorney General, No. 6553 of 1998, V.S. Ct. 180 (2005), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2005/180.html.
244. Id.
245. Id. The court papers simply referred to the deceased's widow as AB or the
applicant and the deceased as Mr. C. In a judgment delivered on July 23, 1998, Gillard J.
ordered that "[t]he proceedings proceed in the name of the applicant by the initial 'AB."'
The judge also prohibited until further order, "[t]he publication of the names of the applicant
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any purpose without a court order. ' 249 The judge left open the question as
to what use could be made of the semen so removed. 250 AB ultimately lost
a court battle to have her dead husband's baby, using the frozen sperm.251
The Supreme Court refused to authorize the procedure on the grounds that
her husband did not give his written consent to the procedure before he
died.252
Justice Chesterman of the Supreme Court of Queensland came to a
somewhat different conclusion in Warren Andrew Gray, decided October
12, 2000.253 In this case, Warren Andrew Gray, a 37-year-old man in
apparent good health, unexpectedly died in his sleep between 10:00 p.m. on
September 26, 2000, and 6:00 a.m. on September 27, 2000.254 Mr. Gray
died intestate. 255 His wife of six years (the applicant) wished at a later date
to become pregnant by means of artificial insemination using semen that
would be taken from her dead husband.25 6 The Monash IVF Queensland
refused to perform the operation needed to remove the semen from the
deceased without a court order.257 To extract semen from the deceased,
surgical removal of a section of his testicles was required.258 Given the
time-sensitive nature of the procedure, it was imperative that the tissue be
removed by 10:00 pm on September 27.259 The applicant brought an
urgent application to the court and the case was heard at 8:00 p.m. on
September 27.260 Although acknowledging the need for the procedure to be
urgently carried out, Justice Chesterman nevertheless denied the
application even though the deceased had consented to the removal of his
organs in the event of death and his next of kin, his father, had given his
consent to the procedure.26' Justice Chesterman noted that he found it
difficult to identify any principle which would justify authorizing the
procedure.262 He opined that, "neither the widow nor the next of kin has a
right to interfere with the body" of the deceased.263
249. AB, No. 6553 of 1998, V.S. Ct. 180 (2005).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Court Denies Woman Right to Use Dead Husband's Sperm, CBC NEWS, May
27, 2005, http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2005/05/27/australia-spermO50527.html.
253. Warren Andrew Gray, (2000) 117 A. Crim. R. 22 (Austl.).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 24.
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D. PPWS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
In the West, rapid change in medical technology is forcing the courts to
grapple with issues that were unimaginable several decades ago. The
problem arises because the law has not kept pace with technological
changes. While it is hardly the business of the law what decision a woman
makes about the use of her husband's sperm, problems arise and state
interest is implicated when the man in question is dead. One person asked,
"[w]hy should we discriminate against a woman who creates a fatherless
child any more than a single mother who chooses to raise a child alone? If
you can leave your assets in a will, why can't you leave behind a child, if
that would have been your wish? ' 264 A deeper level of analysis is called
for precisely because PPWS implicates many societal interests.
1. General Concerns
Judged through the prism of "other" cultures, artificial insemination in
all its variations can be seen as unnatural and scandalous. In societies that
view natural means of procreation to be morally normative or morally
absolute, procreation by artificial insemination is repugnant to public
policy and troubling at best. Most troubling, however, is the practice of
retrieval of sperm and other tissue from the dead for purposes of artificial
insemination - a novel practice in many countries.265  In Victoria,
Australia, Section 43 of the Infertility Treatment Act of 1995 prohibits the
insemination of a woman with sperm from a man known to be dead.266
However, pursuant to section 56 of the same Act, export and subsequent
use of such sperm may be possible with the permission of the Infertility
Treatment Authority.267 The 1996 version of the Ethical Guidelines on
Assisted Reproductive Technology published by the National Health and
Medical Research Council of Australia (NHMRC) listed among
"[p]rohibited/unacceptable practices... [t]he use in ART treatment
,,26'programs of gametes or embryos harvested from cadavers. Although
these guidelines were rescinded, this early reluctance of the NHMRC to
approve the practice of the use of semen harvested from cadavers is
264. Life From Death, Law Spot, Aug. 1998, http://www.law4u.com.au/il/ls_life.
html.
265. Warren Andrew Gray, (2000) 117 A. Crim. R. 22, 23 (Austl.) (Chesterman J.
observing that the issue of retrieval and storage of sperm from a dead man was "novel" and
that "the exigencies of the situation meant that there was little time for research.").
266. Infertility Treatment Act 1995, Act. No. 63/1995 § 43 (Austl.). See also
Belinda Bennett, Posthumous Reproduction and the Meanings of Autonomy, MELBOURNE
U.L. REv. 286 (1999).
267. Infertility Treatment Act 1995, Act. No. 63/1995 § 56 (Austl.).
268. Ethical Guidelines on Assisted Reproduction Technology, National Health and
Medical Research Council § 11.11 (1996), available at http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/
publications/synopses/_files/e28.pdf.
Summer 20081
telling.269 Regarding electroejaculation for retrieval of sperm from a dead
man, Richard V. Grazi and Joel B. Wolowelsky question whether such a
procedure could be allowed under Halakha ("traditional rabbinic Jewish
law and ethics"), as it is forbidden to derive any personal benefit from a270
corpse.
In some cultures, nothing is more unnatural and repugnant than the
removal of body tissue from a dead body and the use of that for procreative
purposes. PPWS (level 3) raises questions about public health and safety,
the dignity and integrity of the dead, and the potential psychological impact
on resulting children. Regarding public health, most cultures recognize
that it is the obligation of the living to promptly bury their dead or
otherwise properly dispose of the bodies. The prompt burial of the dead
helps prevent foul smells and more importantly the spread of diseases.
Common law does not recognize any property right in a corpse, nor any
right to interfere with a dead body.271 Questions also arise regarding the
dignity of the corpse. Retrieval of sperm from a dead man involves the
removal of sections of his testicles. It could be argued that removal of parts
of the body of a deceased violates the dead - something frowned upon in
many societies. Finally, questions arise regarding the rights of the dead.
Although human rights are reserved for the living, it cannot seriously be
argued that the dead have no interest to be protected.272 Does posthumous
conception advance the interest of the deceased? Should any significance
be afforded the interest of the deceased? Would our answer depend on
whether the deceased wished for or objected to posthumous procreation?
Where a man did not indicate his consent to posthumous retrieval of his
sperm, by what principal of law or ethics should such a procedure be
carried out when he dies?
273
Overall, Peter Dans is right in his assertion that "[r]eproductive
technology raises fundamental questions about the nature of human
relationships and what limits, if any, should be placed on human
procreation. ', 274 Although the thought of a bereaved widow attempting to
269. Ethical Guidelines, supra note 268 § 11.11.
270. Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 203.
271. ROHAN HARDCASTLE, LAW AND THE HUMAN BODY: PROPERTY RIGHTS,
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 50 (Hart 2007).
272. Editorial, Posthumous Conception and the Need for Consent, 170 MED. J.
AUSTL. 53, 53-54 (1999), available at http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/janl8/schiff/
schiff.html ("It is clear, though, that certain acts committed after a person's death can either
harm or promote that individual's interests. For example, a posthumous event that destroys a
deceased person's reputation harms his or her interests because it adversely affects the way
that individual is remembered after death.").
273. Warren Andrew Gray, (2000) 117 A. Crim. R. 22, 28 (Austl.). Chesterman J.
declined to give his consent to the surgical removal of the deceased sperm on the grounds
that "[t]he deceased did not in his lifetime indicate his consent to such a procedure." Id.
274. Peter E. Dans, Reproductive Technology: Drawing the Line, 79 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY No. 2 191, 194 (1992).
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keep the memory of her husband alive by harvesting his sperm for
procreative purpose is touching, sympathy alone cannot inform law and
public policy. 275  In discussing the appropriateness of PPWS (level 3)
several questions must be asked:
First, is it ethically and morally right to cause tissue or other bodily
fluid to be removed from a dead man? Should the answer depend on
whether or not the deceased gave prior consent?
Second, who should have the right to cause bodily fluids and tissue to
be removed from the body of the deceased? Should this right be reserved
for the surviving wife of a deceased, or can it be extended to girlfriends,
significant others, parents, and other close surviving relatives?
Third, assuming the personal representative of the deceased has the
right to cause bodily fluids and tissue to be removed from the body of the
deceased, is there any limit to what the personal representative can do with
the material so removed?
276
Fourth, assuming it is ethically sound to remove sperm from a dead
man, who can be impregnated with the retrieved sperm? The deceased
wife? A girlfriend? Any willing woman?
Fifth, is there any danger that cryopreserved sperm will not be used
within the context of a traditional marriage or as the only alternative to
procreation within an anticipated marriage?2 77 In other words, is it possible
that advancement in technology may lead to a situation where the natural
method of procreation is subverted?
Finally, and most important, what is the long-term implication of
PPWS on children born through the use of sperm from cadavers?
2. Posthumous Procreation and Children's Rights in the West
Posthumous procreation in the West implicates the rights and welfare
of children on many fronts. First, unlike the case in Africa, the legal status
as well as inheritance rights of posthumous children in the West are unclear
at best and non-existent at worst. Second, the potential effect of
posthumous procreation on the psychological wellbeing of resulting
children has largely been ignored. Third, posthumous procreation may
indirectly and seriously affect the decedent's surviving children who may
275. Posthumous Conception and the Need for Consent, supra note 272 (observing
that sympathy alone should not inform law and public policy).
276. AB v. Attorney General, No. 6553 of 1998, V.S. Ct. 180 (2005), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vicNSC/2005/180.html ("I have indicated.., that it may
be appropriate to give more thought to the questions that have been raised in the proceeding,
in particular, the question as to what use can be made hereafter of the semen of the
deceased.").
277. Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 203 (observing that contemporary Jewish law
and ethics (Halakha) welcomes the use of cryopreserved sperm to the extent that it is used
within the context of a traditional marriage or as the only alternative to procreation within
an anticipated marriage).
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be confronted with new siblings or half-siblings at any time and without
prior warning.
a. Uncertain Status and Inheritance Rights
In many countries, the legal status and inheritance rights of
posthumous children are uncertain. While some countries grant inheritance
rights to posthumous children expressly provided for in their parent's will,
others do not. Louisiana, for example, expressly outlaws any inheritance
rights for posthumous children.278 Under Louisiana law, a person can only
inherit if he or she existed at the time of death.279 Posthumous children are
thus disqualified from participating in both testate and intestate
succession.28 ° The problem is compounded when there is no inter vivos
planning for the interest of posthumous children. In the United States,
current legislation is insufficient to deal with posthumous procreation. In
the event that a man dies intestate, it would appear that any posthumous
child born cannot inherit from his estate.281 The new Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA) (revised in 2000 and amended in 2002) sheds light on this
problem. 28 2 Comment to Section 707 of the UPA states:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by
assisted reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or
embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting
child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if
assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased
individual would be a parent of the child.283
In essence, unless there is consent in a record, "the death of an individual
whose genetic material is subsequently used either in conceiving an
embryo or in implanting an already existing embryo into a womb ends the
potential legal parenthood of the deceased., 284  In Woodward v.
Commissioner of Social Security, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, faced the following question:
If a married man and woman arrange for sperm to be withdrawn
from the husband for the purpose of artificially impregnating the
wife, and the woman is impregnated with that sperm after the man,
her husband, has died, will children resulting from such pregnancy
278. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. § 953 (2000); see also id. § 1474.
279. Id. § 953.
280. Id.
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enjoy the inheritance rights of natural children under
Massachusetts' law of intestate succession?
285
The Court offered a heavily conditioned response. According to the
Court:
In certain limited circumstances, a child resulting from posthumous
reproduction may enjoy the inheritance rights of "issue" under the
Massachusetts intestacy statute. These limited circumstances exist
where, as a threshold matter, the surviving parent or the child's
other legal representative demonstrates a genetic relationship
between the child and the decedent. The survivor or representative
must then establish both that the decedent affirmatively consented
to posthumous conception and to the support of any resulting child.
Even where such circumstances exist, time limitations may
preclude commencing a claim for succession rights on behalf of a
posthumously conceived child.
286
Although a victory for posthumous children, Woodward v.
Commissioner of Social Security presented a narrow set of circumstances.
On the one hand, the Court did not agree with the government's position
that, because posthumously conceived children are not "in being" as of the
date of the parent's death, they are always barred from enjoying any
inheritance rights.287 On the other hand, the Court did not adopt the wife's
position that, "by virtue of their genetic connection with the decedent,
posthumously conceived children must always be permitted to enjoy the
inheritance rights of the deceased parent's children under [Massachusetts]
law of intestate succession."
288
In the United Kingdom, Section 28(6) of the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act (1990) stipulates that:
Where - (a) the sperm of a man who had given such consent as is
required by paragraph 5 of Schedule 3 to this Act was used for a
purpose for which such consent was required, or (b) the sperm of a
man, or any embryo the creation of which was brought about with
his sperm, was used after his death, he is not to be treated as the
father of the child.289
The result is that even when a man gives consent for his wife to use his
sperm post-mortem, he will not be considered the legal father of any
285. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 262.
288. Id. at 259.
289. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act § 28 (1990), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/actsl990/ukpga-19900037-en.pdf
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resulting offspring. 290 The inheritance and succession rights of posthumous
children are thus not guaranteed. Therefore, no legal relation with the
father and the dead father's relatives (e.g., grandmothers and grandfathers)
may be presumed. Under existing laws in the United States, for example, a
posthumous child cannot assume that his dead father's mother is his
grandmother.2 9'
The uncertainty surrounding the inheritance rights of posthumous
children raises serious issues under the non-discrimination clause of the
CRC, which prohibits discrimination against children on the basis of the
circumstances of their birth.292 Quite unlike the situation in Africa where
posthumous children are readily accepted into the extended family
network, in the West, it is not certain which persons a posthumous child
can claim as a relative.293 Children are thus born into a relational vacuum.
b. Psychological Well-Being of Posthumous Children
One of the strongest arguments against posthumous retrieval and use of
sperm is the effect of this practice on children who are born as a result of
the procedure. Can it be argued seriously that the practice, if allowed,
advances the interests of children in any way? 294 Posthumous children,
even before they are conceived, face what Justice Higgins in the Australian
case of Warren Andrew Gray aptly referred to as a life of "inevitable
fatherlessness. 29 5 Sometimes, all that a posthumous child may get from a
dead father is a letter from the grave. In the California case of Hecht v.
Superior Court, prior to committing suicide, Mr. Kane (the deceased) left a
most unusual letter to any resulting posthumous child.296 He wrote: "I have
loved you in my dreams, even though I never got to see you born. If you
are receiving this letter, it means that I am dead - whether by my own
hand or that of another makes very little difference. I feel that my time has
come; and I wanted to leave you with something more than a dead enigma
that was your father.,
297
Very little thought has been given to how the psychological well-being
of posthumous children may be affected and protected. There are many
unknowns at this point. In Andrew Warren Gray, Justice Higgins
observed:
290. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act § 28 (1990), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/actsl990/ukpga 19900037_en.pdf.
291. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra 281, § 204(a)(2).
292. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 136, at art. 2.
293. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra 281, § 204(a)(2).
294. Posthumous Conception and the Need for Consent, supra note 272 ("Might the
child be adversely affected by being knowingly denied access to one biological parent?").
295. Warren Andrew Gray, (2000) 117 A. Crim. R. 22, 29 (Austl.).
296. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 277 (1993) (depublished).
297. Id.
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The very nature of the conception may cause the child
embarrassment or more serious emotional problems as it grows up.
More significant, because the court can never know in what
circumstances the child may be born and brought up, it is
impossible to know what is in its best interest. 298
Even if one may not fully agree with Judge Higgins, it has to be
admitted that the potential risks to children of ART, combined with the
absence of a father, warrants care in the way society approaches
posthumous procreation.
c. Rights of the Decedent's "Other" Children
How might posthumous conception and reproduction affect the
emotional, psychological, and financial well-being of a deceased's
preexisting children? Undoubtedly, posthumous procreation can have
enduring consequences on the living and may jeopardize the welfare and
development of surviving children. In Woodward v. Commissioner of
Social Security, the Massachusetts Supreme Court observed that, where a
man died intestate, awarding inheritance rights to posthumous children
could seriously undermine the rights and interests of the decedent's pre-
existing children. 299 According to the Court:
In the context of our intestacy laws, the best interests of the
posthumously conceived child, while of great importance, are not
in themselves conclusive. They must be balanced against other
important State interests, not the least of which is the protection of
children who are alive or conceived before the intestate parent's
death. In an era in which serial marriages, serial families, and
blended families are not uncommon, according succession rights
under our intestacy laws to posthumously conceived children may,
in a given case, have the potential to pit child against child and
family against family. Any inheritance rights of posthumously
conceived children will reduce the intestate share available to
children born prior to the decedent's death.30 0
In Hecht v. Superior Court, the decedent's adult children, William
Everett Kane, Jr. and Katherine Kane, sought to prevent the petitioner,
Deborah Ellen, from conceiving a child using their deceased father's
sperm.30 ' Prior to his death, William Kane had deposited a total of fifteen
298. Warren Andrew Gray (2000) 117 A. Crim. R. 22, 29 (Austl.).
299. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E. 2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002).
300. Id.
301. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276; Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222,
223 (1996).
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vials of his sperm at a sperm bank.3 °2 The Court found that there was
abundant documentary evidence of decedent's intent that the sperm vials
were for the sole purpose of Hecht's use in conceiving and birthing their
child. 3 The decedent's children got to know of the possibility of a future
sibling for the first time after the death of their father through a letter dated
October 21, 1991.304 In a letter addressed "To my Children" and intended
to be read after his death, the decedent wrote:
I address this to my children, because, although I have only two...
it may be that Deborah will decide - as I hope she will - to have
a child by me after my death. I've been assiduously generating
frozen sperm samples for that eventuality. If she does, then this
letter is for my posthumous offspring, as well ... 30'
The Court concluded that Deborah Hecht was entitled to the fifteen
vials of sperm deposited by Hecht prior to his death.30 6 According to the
Court:
[There] has never been a dispute over whether women shall be
allowed to produce children through sperm donated by now dead
fathers. Under current law and technology Hecht could have gone
to this same cryobank and obtained sperm from an anonymous
donor, including one who is no longer alive. All we decided was
her entitlement to the sperm of a particular donor, the man she had
loved and lived with for five years. It became an issue only
because of an unusual, and perhaps unique, configuration of
personalities and motivations. Unfortunately, it also took three
years of litigation and three trips to this court to finally resolve the
question.307
The Court did not decide the thornier issue of the inheritance right of any
child that may result from Deborah's use of the sperm and how the inheritance
right of such a child may conflict with the inheritance right of William Kane's
surviving children.308 According to the Court, "[w]e do not have before us the
many legal questions raised by the possible birth of a child to Hecht through
use of Kane's sperm. Thus, we do not decide, for instance, whether that child
would be entitled to inherit any property as Kane's heir. 30 9 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Woods noted that posthumous procreation may implicate
302. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.
303. Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 223.
304. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277.
305. Id.
306. Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 228.
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some state interest and called upon the legislature to intervene. 310 According
to Justice Woods:
[I]t is far more in keeping with the function of the legislature to
explore what legislation might be needed to regulate gametic
donations. Courts are poorly equipped to address such an issue. I
encourage the legislature to immediately embark upon fixing a
policy by legislation which will regulate and define the permissible
parameters of gametic donations by individuals in this state.3 1
In conclusion, in the United States and other Western countries,
developing reproductive technology has outpaced legislation with the effect
that in many countries, existing laws do not directly address the legal issues
312created by posthumous conception. In the absence of specific legislation
on the subjects, courts have adopted an intent-based approach to the
issue.313 In effect, the intent of the donor is treated as the primary factor in
determining whether to allow posthumous insemination.314 The intent-
based approach is, however, problematic on many levels. First, the intent
of the donor could adversely affect the interests of the living as in the case
of a decedent's surviving children. Second, the intent of the donor may be
irresponsible, for example, if the donor requests that a bank release his
sperm to fifty different women in order to maximize his chances to
procreate. As Aziza-Shuster rightly notes, there is nothing that stops a
donor from bequeathing his spermatozoa "to impregnate his daughter or his
mother, or even a gorilla.,' 31 5  In short, the intent-based approach is
ultimately unhelpful in addressing the deep ethical and moral issues raised
by posthumous procreation because, besides the deceased and a grieving
widow, there are many other compelling interests implicated by the
practice.
310. Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 229. As stated by Justice Woods:
Although I possess a good dose of Orwellian caution when it comes to
governmental interference in such intimate matters as the Hecht/Kane
arrangement in this instance, I am not convinced that the state as an entity is
devoid of "any" sufficient interest to justify interference in such matters. I
would caution that our initial opinion and this opinion should not be
construed beyond the facts of the instant matter. It is beyond the capacity of
this court to speculate on all of the consequences that might be spawned
should our initial opinion and the opinion herein be construed too broadly.
Id. (Wood, J., concurring).
311. Id.
312. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2004).
313. Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227.
314. Id.
315. Aziza-Shuster, supra note 207, at 2184.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Is there a right to procreate? Is there a right to an heir? The idea and
practice of posthumous procreation is ancient.316 Given the fundamental
need, if not right, to procreate, societies have from "time immemorial"
created mechanisms to overcome the frustration of procreation as a result
of infertility and premature male death.31v PPAS and PPWS are essentially
different approaches to the same basic problem of the "absoluteness of
physical death." Posthumous procreation finds justification in the need for
social continuity.
Posthumous procreation in Africa is somewhat comparable to
posthumous procreation in the West and very comparable to the practice of
artificial insemination of a married woman by a male donor's sperm.
Posthumous procreation in Africa and the West involve continued contact
with the dead by the living. PPAS differs from PPWS to the extent that
with respect to the latter, there are linkages created by the dead man's
sperm and the genetic material it contains. Whereas with PPAS, there is no
genetic linkage between the dead man and any children attributable to him.
In Africa, poverty and the lack of access to modem technology makes it
impossible to procreate noncoitally using a decedent's sperm, as is done in
the West today. Nevertheless, in Africa as well as the West, the effect of
,,3 1 8posthumous reproduction is "the dislocation of reproductive events. In
both Africa and the West, posthumous procreation "raises important
questions about marriage, paternity, and mortality," and fundamentally
challenges "the normative structures or values of family and kinship. 319
In Africa as in the West, biology does not always determine parentage.
For example, in the West, when a married woman is artificially
inseminated by a male donor's sperm, the husband, not the male donor, is
deemed the legal father of the resulting child.32° Indeed, legislation is
sometimes carefully crafted to protect the sperm donor from any
obligations of parenthood and to protect the donee from any future claim of
rights to parenthood by the donor. For example, Section 702 of the
Uniform Parentage Act provides that "[a] donor is not a parent of a child
conceived by means of assisted reproduction. 321 Under the UPA, donors
are completely eliminated from the parental equation and can neither sue to
establish parental rights nor be required to support the resulting child.322
316. Bob Simpson, Making 'Bad' Deaths 'Good': The Kinship Consequences of
Posthumous Conception, 7 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 1, 1-18 (2001).
317. Id. at 1.
318. Simpson, supra note 316, at 13.
319. Id.
320. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 281, § 204.
321. Id. § 702.
322. Id.
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In evaluating Africa's approach to posthumous procreation, it must be
remembered that artificial insemination as practiced in the West today was
once frowned upon in many Western countries. One such example is the
1921 case of Oxford v. Oxford in which the court equated artificial
insemination with adultery, observing that the essence of adultery was "not
in the moral turpitude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary
surrender to another person of the reproductive powers or faculties.
3 23
The repugnancy test invoked during the colonial period in Africa was a
clear reflection of the ethnocentric bias in legal systems in Africa. In
contemporary Africa, the repugnancy test has gained a new lease of life in
the hands of a judiciary determined to promote human rights. Unless
carefully deployed, international human rights norms will not fare any
better in contemporary Africa. Admittedly, it is difficult to analyze and
compare practices that are rooted in different societies. However, it is
culturally imperialistic for human rights bodies such as the CEDAW
Committee to condemn practices that are embedded in non-Western
cultures while ignoring arguably comparable practices in the West.
Regarding posthumous procreation in general, a comprehensive and
genuinely universal approach to human rights work is called for - an
approach that requires communication within and among cultures.
Africans are faced with the challenge of reforming customary laws and
practices that seriously threaten public heath and safety, are obsolete, and
otherwise implicate fundamental rights of women and children. In the
West, where rapidly expanding medical technology makes noncoital
posthumous conception and reproduction possible, many complex and
troubling issues also arise which cannot be ignored. Faced with vast
advances in medical technology, should the law adapt to accommodate
posthumous conception and reproduction in all its many varieties?
324
Customary law is not static but has a tendency to change, albeit slowly.
In the 1908 case of Lewis v. Bankole, Justice Osborn rightly observed that:
"[o]ne of the most striking features of West African native custom.., is its
flexibility; it appears to have been always subject to motives of expediency,
and it shows unquestionable adaptability to altered circumstances without
entirely losing its character. '32 5 Additionally, in the 1976 case of Ejanor v.
Okonome, the cautionary note of the learned judge rings true today. He
cautioned: "I think we must not be in a hurry... to condemn the old and
established customary law of the people ... where the people have all
323. HARI DEv KOHLI, LAW AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILD 35 (Anmol Publications Pvt.
Ltd. 2003) (citing Oxford v. Oxford, [1921] 58 O.L.R. 251 (Can.)).
324. Warren Andrew Gray, (2000) 117 A. Crim. R. 22,29 (Austl.) (Higgins, J.,
dissenting) ("As science progresses the law will obviously face frequent challenges for
which there may be no adequate precedent .... ").
325. Yusuff v. Dada et al., [1990] 7 N.I.L.R. 13 (Nig.) available at http://www.
nigeria-law.org/LawReporting.htm (citing Lewis v. Bankole, [1908] 1 N.L.R. 81, 100-01
(Nig.)).
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along regulated their lives by that custom.
32 6
Posthumous procreation in all its variations is about adults exercising
their rights to found a family. Procreative autonomy, according to Ronald
Dworkin, is "a right (of people) to control their own role in procreation
unless the State has a compelling reason for denying them that control.
327
Very little attention has been paid to the interest of the resulting children. 28
Would such children be better off not being born? Is Harris really correct
in his assertion that it is better to exist than not to exist?329 There is a need
to pay closer attention to how the rights and welfare of the children may be
affected and how these rights could be adequately safeguarded. There is
urgent need to investigate posthumous procreation and conduct human
rights work in this area from both the perspective of "we" and "others,"
"westerners" and "non-westerners," "insiders" and "outsiders." As aptly
noted by one commentator:
Contemporary human rights work and talk mask fundamental
assumptions about how human society is organised. In reality,
there is a natural variety to how human society is organised, and,
therefore, to how human rights are understood and experienced in
different societies. These differences should necessitate a humble
and informed cross-cultural dialogue about human rights. Non-
formal systems of social organisation have long received the
attention of anthropologists as some kind of exotic field of interest.
Yet, they constitute a substantial part of that majority of the human
community that exists outside the actual authority of the state
sector, on whom the credibility of contemporary human rights
protection is hinged. There is much that the human rights
movement can learn from and give to norms and structures evolved
in these settings.330
326. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 55, at 585-86.
327. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION AND
EUTHANASIA 148 (Harper Collins 1993).
328. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 148
(observing that in discussions about ART, there is no mention that children are the result of
assisted human reproduction).
329. John Harris, Rights and Reproductive Choice, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN
REPRODUCTION: ETHICS, CHOICE, AND REGULATION 5, 21 (John Harris and Soren Holm eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
330. Odinkalu, supra note 132, at 13.
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